

**IOWA PLAN FOR LOCAL
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
RESPONSE CAPACITY
FOR WMD EVENTS STATEWIDE**

Report to the Commissioner of Public
Safety by the EOD Task Force



May 2005

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PLAN FOR LOCAL IOWA EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL RESPONSE CAPACITY FOR WMD EVENTS STATEWIDE

Background

Local Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) response capacity in Iowa is limited to seven local jurisdictions and the State Fire Marshals Office. While some existing EOD teams aim for a WMD/Terrorism level of response ability, costs for the specialized equipment and additional training are largely out of reach of local departmental budgets.

In keeping with national priorities expressed by US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Iowa's state and local homeland security, emergency management, and first responder leaders adopted a priority to develop and maintain local EOD response capacity for WMD/Terrorist incidents statewide. US DHS clearly has communicated to state and local officials its expectation that resources should be used in a manner to avoid duplication of capacity and to collaborate in procuring and accessing specialized equipment.

The EOD Task Force was formalized in fall 2004 to work through issues related to achieving local WMD/Terrorist response capacity anywhere in the state. Under the purview of Iowa Department of Public Safety, State Fire Marshals Office, a process facilitator was retained to design and manage this decision process to meet timelines of the DHS Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) Grant requirements.

Challenge

Achieving this goal of creating access to WMD/Terrorist capacity at the local level for EOD incidents required careful consideration, balance, and compromise on the part of participating local jurisdictions. The seven local jurisdictions with existing EOD teams typically lacked specialized equipment and training to bring them to WMD/Terrorist levels. Likewise, the State Fire Marshals Office, which has statutory responsibilities for EOD response anywhere in the state when requested by the local jurisdiction, experienced a similar equipment and training shortfall in meeting WMD/Terrorist capacities. In the event of a WMD/terrorist incident, many parts of the state would not be properly equipped financially or operationally to respond appropriately.

Issues that needed to be resolved by the EOD Task Force included:

- Composition and location of teams and technicians.
- Priority for types of equipment to be obtained.
- Distribution and location of equipment.
- Triggers for "regional" team call-out.
- Protocols for statewide EOD response.
- Form and general contents of contractual document; 28E Agreement.

The State Fire Marshals Office (SFO) and facilitator State Public Policy Group (SPPG) began with a review of previous work undertaken to resolve key issues surrounding the statewide Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) response capacity by local jurisdictions. The EOD Task Force was created to address the unresolved issues, set in motion the implementation of their plan, and recommend strategies for sustainability of the local response capacity.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation Bomb Data Center (FBI-BDC) and the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board (NBSCAB) established standards for bomb squad response equipment and training and certifies trained technicians. Currently, no new EOD technicians can be certified because of FBI requirements that new teams must have a robot and the two-year waiting list to receive initial training and certification.

New FBI requirements mandate that all certified EOD teams must have an EOD-9 full coverage bomb suit and a robot for use by 2009. They are also required to have new X-ray equipment, detection and monitoring equipment, and training on all new equipment.

The Task Force determined the initial priority is to bring existing squads up to the same response level and to pre-position a multi-function robotics platform with agencies spread across the state to ensure a remote capability is available to each EOD team.

Task Force and Chiefs and Sheriffs: Cooperation

The EOD Task Force was built upon an existing group of bomb squad commanders that had taken up the discussion about statewide EOD response capacity in early 2004. Adjustments were made in participation to allow for additional representation of commanders from throughout the state, inclusion of the SFO, and addition of officers from jurisdictions without a bomb squad. Throughout the process, Task Force members kept their police chiefs and sheriffs informed about the issues and deliberations.

The first meeting of the Task Force was held December 15, 2004. The group got acquainted, reviewed the challenge, clarified the unresolved issues, and began discussing solutions to the issues. At the next meeting, January 11, 2005, the Task Force drafted the potential best solutions for Iowa. At the last meeting, February 8, 2005, the Task Force members made minor adjustments and approved the proposed plan.

The police chiefs and sheriffs from the Task Force members' jurisdictions met on February 24, 2005, and approved the proposed plan after brief discussion. The cooperative work between the two groups, through individual communication

and relationships, ensured the successful construction of the plan. The discussions from these meetings shaped the script and guided discussion questions used later for outreach meetings with stakeholders and policymakers from around the state to elicit thoughtful feedback and assist with implementation of the proposal.

Key Elements of WMD/Terrorism Capacity for EOD Response

Composition of Local Teams and Techs

Currently, bomb squads in seven communities around Iowa and the Fire Marshals office provide local EOD response. These local EOD units respond to calls primarily within their jurisdictions and sometimes outside their boundaries, which may be based upon a multi-county formalized agreement and/or a level of "gentlemen's agreement" arising out of need. The state, through the Fire Marshal, has a statutory responsibility to respond to any EOD incident in any local jurisdiction if requested by that jurisdiction, regardless of whether it is deemed a WMD/terrorist situation or not.

EOD teams are currently operating in the following jurisdictions:

- Council Bluffs Police Department/Pottawattamie County Sheriff's Office
- Des Moines Police Department
- Waterloo Police Department
- Cedar Rapids Police Department
- Linn County Sheriff's Office/Marion Police Department
- Iowa City Police Department/Coralville Police Department/Johnson County Sheriff's Office
- Davenport Police Department/Scott County Sheriff's Office
- State Fire Marshals Office, which has technicians in Council Bluffs, Denison, Spencer, Clear Lake, Osceola, Mt. Pleasant, Cedar Rapids, Waterloo/Cedar Falls, Des Moines.

Priority for Types of Equipment to be Maintained

Equipment should be procured and placed to maximize the resources and eliminate duplication. The priority for the initial purchases of equipment is to ensure that each team is able to comply with FBI minimum standards and maintain or elevate its WMD/terrorism capacity. These include the robot and EOD-9 full coverage bomb suit necessary to comply with the FBI's 2009 deadline. Purchase of digital X-ray equipment and detection and monitoring devices for each team are also priorities. Subsequent purchases will consider maintaining the minimum FBI standards as highest priority, replace or repair equipment, and then turn toward additional equipment or new technology.

If any of the existing bomb squads already have the equipment that is suggested for purchase to maintain the FBI minimum standards, that team has the option of using that share of funds to purchase necessary equipment that will continue

to enhance the WMD/terrorism response capacity of that team. Alternatively, if that team wants to defer use of those funds to another jurisdiction that needs the funds to meet the standards, it may do so.

Distribution and Location of Equipment

Placement of robots will not prohibit use of the robot by any existing EOD team. Protocols will be required for gaining access to and using the robot. Under terms of the 28E Agreement, any repair or other expenses associated with a WMD call-out would be the responsibility of the state.

Robots may also be used for non-WMD call-outs, such as a HazMat incident. In those cases, damage, breakage, or maintenance costs will be borne by the jurisdiction that caused the damage. In a non-WMD call-out, routine responsibility of personnel, transportation, and all their expenses will be the responsibility of the requesting jurisdictions. In addition, the jurisdiction in which the robot is placed will bear the costs of routine maintenance and repair, training, and operations of the robot.

Existing robots are available in the following areas:

- Des Moines Police Department
- Des Moines State Fire Marshal
- Davenport/Scott County (belongs to Rock Island, but available for WMD response in Iowa)
- Council Bluffs Police Department/Pottawattamie County (two robots belong to Omaha, but available for WMD response in Pottawattamie County)

After consideration by the Task Force, it was determined that adequate local response could be available by adding three additional robots strategically placed. Robots will be purchased and placed in:

- Denison State Fire Marshal
- Waterloo Police Department
- Cedar Rapids Police Department

The FBI recently announced that each local EOD team must comply with the requirement to have a robot by 2009. A team may not enter into a 28E Agreement with another jurisdiction that has a robot to gain access to that robot for purposes of compliance with this requirement. This creates additional challenges for local teams in maintaining their EOD team certification. The FBI has not, however, provided a definition of what it considers a robot. With the expectation that mini-robots will be acceptable, providing this equipment becomes more affordable for local jurisdictions.

That said, the priorities of the federal funding agencies encourage sharing of equipment and resources, and local jurisdictions should consider the possibility of restructuring or merging their bomb squads in recognition of the federal expectations.

Triggers for a Regional Team Call-Out

Decisions to request WMD/Terrorism EOD response will rely on the judgment of the local incident commander. Clearly, the local first responders will encounter the situation and determine the need for a certified bomb technician to assess the situation. Once the certified bomb technician has arrived on-scene, they will make the decision on whether a WMD/Terrorist level call-out is needed, based on their training and expertise in context of the situation.

The WMD EOD Team call-out can be made by:

- The certified bomb tech on scene
- HLSEM Duty Officer or Administrator
- Governor

Protocols for Statewide EOD Response

The state will be considered a single region for purposes of including existing bomb squads in the initiative. This means there are no artificial “boundaries” around counties to create regions of the state for EOD WMD/terrorist response. The Fire Marshals Office retains the obligation for response anywhere in the state.

In case of a WMD/terrorism incident, a number of options exist for response, depending on the jurisdiction facing the situation and its relative location to the EOD regional teams and the Fire Marshal’s teams. The following examples illustrate how the system will work.

Location of WMD/Terrorist Incident	EOD Unit Called to Respond	EOD Unit(s) Called if Escalation
Jurisdiction with EOD unit	Home jurisdiction	Fire Marshal unit(s) or nearby local unit(s)
Jurisdiction without EOD unit	Fire Marshal unit	Fire Marshal unit(s) or nearby local unit(s)
Jurisdiction without EOD unit	Nearby local unit	Fire Marshal unit(s) or additional local unit(s)

28E Agreement

A draft of the 28E Agreement has been published. It includes many of the items mentioned, as well as some important non-negotiable elements. First, to comply with the 28E, the jurisdiction must agree to respond to a WMD/terrorist incident

outside its own jurisdiction if requested by the incident commander, HLSEM, or the Governor. The jurisdiction must sign the 28E Agreement with the state and agree to maintain the certified bomb squad into the future, beyond the period in which federal funds may be available for its support. Duplication of capacity in nearby jurisdictions will be discouraged by requiring placement of key resources such that the entire state will have access to equitable capacity and response.

After signing the 28E Agreement, once a call-out has been made by a certified bomb technician for a WMD/Terrorist level threat to an area where a bomb squad must travel outside its jurisdiction, the state of Iowa agrees to pay the cost. The state will also cover officers who are injured, treating them as if they were in their home jurisdiction. Under these conditions, the legal liability will also fall to the state of Iowa. Non-WMD/terrorist level callouts will be the financial burden of the requesting jurisdiction.

Funding Considerations

Funding for this local EOD capacity development effort is provided from the local portion of the US DHS, Office for Domestic Preparedness funds for FY 04 and FY 05. Beyond these two years, it is not yet known whether additional funding designated for local EOD response capacity will be available.

Funding requests were submitted to Iowa HLSEM and reviewed by The First Responder Advisory Committee. General Dardis and Administrator Miller make final budget approvals. The approved funding levels for FY 04 are \$1 million; for FY 05, \$1,000,250 was approved. Representatives of the EOD teams developed an itemized budget based on the priorities and decisions reflected in this report. The budget is included in the Appendix.

Additional Considerations

Throughout the eight-month process, participating individuals and their departments displayed a positive and cooperative attitude with a determination to produce a workable solution to the challenges of local response to WMD/Terrorist EOD situations. The discussions and issues were framed by the overarching FBI mandates for certification and equipment and allowed the Task Force to narrow its focus within these certain parameters.

While hope was expressed that there would not be a need to activate a local WMD level team for an EOD incident, all agreed it was important to have this capacity in Iowa.

Following agreement by the Task Force and the Chiefs and Sheriffs, the facilitator group, State Public Policy Group, undertook a series of outreach meetings to present the new capacity and protocols to local stakeholders and policymakers. In 12 sessions held in six communities, additional information was

brought forward. See the Appendix for a more detailed description of these themes brought forward by participants across the state:

- There is a definite need for WMD/Terrorist level response for EOD in all areas of the state, though the likelihood of an event is less than in large urban areas of the US.
- Unified command will be critical in response to any EOD incident because of the multi-jurisdictional nature of that response.
- The parameters of the response time are adequate given the overall constraints of the funding opportunities.
- Local jurisdictions are sensitive to any additional local funding requirements this procedure may require if the call-out protocols are not clearly outlined regarding “who pays” under certain circumstances.
- Stakeholders are satisfied with the effort to develop this WMD/Terrorist level capacity at the local level, particularly the currently-underserved areas; at the same time their primary concerns are “false alarms” and whether local funding would be necessary to cover costs of those false alarms.
- Should the federal funding to support the local response across jurisdictional lines diminish or be ended, local leaders of jurisdictions with no current bomb teams feel no obligation to share the financial burden with the jurisdictions serving as WMD-level response teams.
- Educating all appropriate responders about this capacity and the protocols of a call-out will be instrumental in its acceptance and success.

One law enforcement leader expressed the views of most by indicating that this simply represents a new capacity and resource that local jurisdictions may access when needed. The protocol is reasonable and practical from the perspective of the local first responders.

On several occasions, participants expressed concern about the response time from the Fire Marshals Office. Particularly in the more rural areas, jurisdictions count on the Fire Marshals staff in many types of situations where their capacity is exceeded. They have a fear that with the current understaffing of that state office there will be an increased response time. They encourage leadership to give attention to this concern.

The Participants

EOD Task Force Members

Gary Anderson, Appanoose County Sheriff's Office
John Chipman, Marion Police Department
Brent Cirksena, Waterloo Police Department
Chad Driver, Pottawattamie County Sheriff's Office
August "Dutch" Geisinger, Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management
Bob Hagist, Cedar Rapids Police Department
Don Huss, Davenport Police Department
Matt Johnson, Iowa City Police Department
Mike Keefe, Iowa State Fire Marshals Office
Jim Kenkel, Iowa State Fire Marshal
Len Murray, Des Moines Police Department
Tim Pillack, Waterloo Police Department
Dave Schipper, Iowa State Fire Marshals Office
Brian Weldon, Waterloo Police Department
Melvin Williams, Sioux City Police Department
Mike Zlatohlavek, Linn County Sheriff's Office

Police Chiefs and Sheriffs

Gary Anderson, Sheriff, Appanoose County
Barry Bedford, Chief, Coralville Police Department
Mike Bladel, Chief, Davenport Police Department
Dennis Conrad, Sheriff, Scott County
Jeff Danker, Sheriff, Pottawattamie County
Harry Daugherty, Chief, Marion Police Department
Joe Frisbie, Chief, Sioux City Police Department
Bob Garrison, Chief, Iowa State Patrol
August "Dutch" Geisinger, Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management
Thomas Jennings, Chief, Waterloo Police Department
Jim Kenkel, State Fire Marshal
Mike Klappolz, Chief, Cedar Rapids Police Department
Bill McCarthy, Chief, Des Moines Police Department
Keith Mehlin, Chief, Council Bluffs Police Department
Lonny Pulkrabek, Sheriff, Johnson County
Kevin Techau, Commissioner, Iowa Department of Public Safety
Kim Wadding, Chief, Dubuque Police Department
RJ Winkelhake, Chief, Iowa City Police Department
Don Zeller, Sheriff, Linn County

APPENDICES

Plan Implementation

Once the EOD plan for local WMD/Terrorism response capacity was accepted by the EOD Task Force and the Police Chiefs and Sheriffs, commanders of the local jurisdictions were charged with working in a smaller group to complete the necessary documents required to move the initiative forward in a timely manner. Drafts of documents were circulated to the larger group, comments incorporated into the drafts, with final documents completed late in May.

The following pieces were developed by representatives of the designated teams and follow in this section:

- Timeline for Implementation
- Implementation Plan
- Budget
- 28E Agreement

Implementation Plan

IOWA'S EOD TASK FORCE Implementation Plan: May 5, 2005

State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP)

The U. S. Department of Homeland Security established the "State Homeland Security Grant Program" (SHSGP) to assist states and local governments to enhance the preparedness of the nation to combat terrorism. In addition, SHSGP includes planning and administrative funds to support updating and implementing State Homeland Security Strategic Plans and funds to support training at the state and local level.

Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management has written two updates to the original "Iowa Homeland Security Strategy: Envisioning the Future", based in part on the recommendations of the First Responders Advisory Committee. The "FY 2004 The Iowa Homeland Security Strategy (Condensed)" Objective 5.5 Page 25, and "FY 2005 The Iowa Homeland Security Strategy" Objective 5.5 Page 29 identifies Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) among the response capabilities and capacities to be expanded.

The First Responders Advisory Committee recommended that \$1 million dollars from the FY 2004 State Homeland Security Grant Program's 80% pass through to local governments, be set aside to expand response capabilities and capacity for EOD response.

In December 2004, representatives of the EOD Task Force presented a proposal to the First Responders Advisory Committee, requesting additional funding from the FY 2005 State Homeland Security Grant Program. After much deliberation, an additional \$1,000,250 dollars was approved for the EOD Task Force. (Budget presentation attached)

The FY 2004 SHSGP funds were awarded to the State of Iowa on December 31, 2003 and the grant period ends on November 30, 2005. The FY 2005 SHSPG were awarded to the State of Iowa on February 28, 2005 and the grant period ends on March 31, 2007.

State Public Policy Group (SPPG) EOD Task Force

The initial EOD Committee was formed in early 2004 and was led by the State Fire Marshall's Office. While the initial committee achieved much progress, several administrative issues remained and a general consensus among the members was difficult to establish within the parameters that were presented.

In September of 2004, Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management and Iowa's Department of Public Safety contracted with the State Public Policy Group to establish Task Forces to facilitate group discussion, identify issues, organize the work products and establish consensus on a broad range of issues. The first EOD Task Force meeting occurred on December 15, 2004.

The general consensus was to maximize the use of the state's thirty-four (34) certified bomb technicians, to build weapons of mass destruction response capacity across the state. This is to be accomplished by investing in the eight (8) existing accredited bomb squads already providing statewide coverage.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation Bomb Data Center (FBI-BDC) and the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board (NBSCAB) established standards for bomb squad response equipment and training. The initial funding priority is to bring existing squads up to the same response level and to preposition a multi-function robotics platform with agencies spread across the state to ensure a remote capability is available to each bomb squad.

Other issues discussed includes:

- The need for digital X-ray processing equipment since Polaroid has announced the discontinuation of TPX X-ray film and an uncertainty of continued X-ray film production.
- The Federal requirement that all bomb squads must have a robot by 2009 to remain an accredited bomb squad. (Without accreditation the squad is longer eligible to participate in federal training programs or to receive federal equipment)
- Each bomb squad needs to be equipped with a MED-ENG EOD-9 full coverage bomb suit for use in a WMD environment and the related self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
- Detection and monitoring equipment for each team, some of which should be remotely deployed via the robotics platform.
- The new equipment will require each team members to receive training.
- The teams need to train with each other in statewide training, as well as participating in joint training with local responders, tactical teams, hazardous materials teams and with the 71st Civil Support Team.
- The training will take front line people away from their normally assigned duties for extended periods of time and some amount of funding was allocated to assist participating jurisdictions backfill the positions.

The final report from SPPG is due in May 2005.

28 E Agreements

The Task Force believes that each participating jurisdiction needed to be a signatory to the Iowa Mutual Aid Compact (IMAC), however the state conveyed that individual 28 E Agreements would be required from each participating jurisdiction to cover Task Force operations. Following the achievement of consensus for the operational concepts for the task forces between the chief's, sheriff's and state representatives, the 28 E Agreement was developed.

It was decided to model the 28 E Agreements for both EOD and Tactical Task Forces, after the Urban Search & Rescue (USAR) Team 28 E Agreements. We believed that since the USAR Agreements had already been reviewed and approved by the Iowa Attorney General's Office, Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management and two local jurisdictions, they would likely be acceptable to most of the participating entities. We also wanted to keep consistency between the various agreements and Task Force operations to ease the burden on jurisdictions that are participating in multiple task forces and the state. Most changes relate directly to the differences in the functions of the EOD Task Force and the inclusion of the respective agency pension systems.

The original drafts were developed and submitted for review by Task Force members on March 20, 2005. The draft was revised twice before the first consensus was reached. The draft was presented to SPPG on April 04, 2005 for submission to the state. The City of Cedar Rapids provided late comments that were incorporated in a final Agreement draft that was submitted to the State Attorney General's Office on May 19, 2005. The Task Force was originally advised that no purchases could be made, until one local jurisdiction had signed the 28 E Agreement.

The State Attorney General's Office may revise the proposed draft of the 28 E Agreement. The product from the Attorney General's review will be submitted to the Department of Public Safety and Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management for review and approval.

The participating jurisdiction's review and approval cannot begin until the state agencies have a final version of the 28 E Agreements. Each jurisdiction will submit the agreements to their attorneys and risk managers. We hope the participating jurisdictions will accept the agreement as written and will not request additional language that significantly alters the agreement or creates inconsistencies between the various task forces. After the local review processes, the agreements will need to be submitted with supporting documentation and appropriate publication on city council or county boards of supervisors agendas for resolution and the respective elected official's signature.

We expect the participating agency review and approval processes to take 30 to 45 days.

Task Force Leadership

We recognize the need to maintain the "Task Force" concept after the final report from SPPG. We recommend the development of a "Task Force Leadership Committee" that would be comprised of the Task Force Commander or designee from each of the participating entities and a representative of Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management in an advisory capacity. The chairman and vice-chairman should be would be rotating positions identified by the members of the Task Force Leadership Committee.

The Task Force Leadership Committee would be responsible for establishing program budgets, equipment specifications, coordinating equipment purchases and dissemination, establishing statewide joint and multi-discipline training opportunities and participation in regional exercises. The Task Force Leadership Committee would also review all responses and provide recommendations on improving the process for future responses.

The Task Force Leadership Committee would be responsible for reporting to and keeping their jurisdictions and Iowa Homeland Security informed of Task Force matters and for the completion of grant program reporting requirements.

2004 Project Budget

The proposed FY 2004 SHSGP Project Budget is attached for review. The primary purchases will be related to the high priority response equipment. The training, exercising and backfill costs will be delayed until the FY 2005 SHSGP Budget. First, each squad will need to have access to the new equipment in order to be adequately trained in its' use, and secondly, we are approaching the November 30, 2005 deadline for the FY 2004 SHSPG funding period. We do not have adequate time to prepare and schedule the training opportunities. Task Force participants will continue to participate in local, regional and state exercises at their current level of capability and availability.

2004 Equipment Specifications

The FBI-BDC and NBSCAB has already identified and set standards for nationwide bomb squad equipment, training, certification and accreditation. Bomb technicians must re-certify every three years in a series of written and practical examinations on specific brands and models of equipment. Many of the bomb squads already have researched and purchased specific equipment, and the Task Force wants to maintain as much consistency as possible among the Task Force participants to allow sharing of equipment and personnel during responses.

We have already been working towards the procurement of standardized equipment and have developed recent quotes for many of the priority items such as the robotics platform, bomb suits, X-ray systems and bomb disrupters. We still have some work ahead of us on identifying the brands of self-contained breathing apparatus in use by the existing squads. There are three specific brands and models that have been identified as compatible with EOD suit operations, and we want to move towards a common statewide standard if possible.

Each Task Force commander will be involved in continuing discussions and meetings to create consensus in the equipment being proposed for purchase. The refined specifications will be sent forward for purchasing.

2004 Equipment Purchasing

We recognize the importance of purchasing power and since we will be purchasing much of the same manufacture and model numbers of equipment, it makes sense for the Task Force to consolidate it's efforts and work through a centralized purchasing process. Upon the direction of Iowa Homeland Security we are ready to begin the purchasing process through either the Iowa's General Service's Administration or City of Des Moines. We recommend the purchasing effort for the Task Force be coordinated through Iowa Homeland Security, the State Fire Marshall and the City of Des Moines, which are located within blocks of each other to expedite this effort and ensure adequate input with the purchasing agents occurs. All Task Force commanders must be kept abreast of all purchasing efforts.

The delivery of robots is estimated to be 5 to 6 months from the date the order is received by the manufacturer. We have been informed that the SHSGP Funding is based on the actual receipt of the goods and the FY 2004 funding period ends on November 2005. We have less than seven months to complete the purchasing process for the first priority - robotics platforms.

2004 Final Reporting

Final reports to the U. S. Department of Homeland Security are due within 120 days of the end of the grant period (March 31, 2006). The Task Force Leadership Committee will cooperate with Iowa Homeland Security (State Administrative Agency) to fulfill the reporting requirements to include the Financial Status Report (FSR) and the Biannual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR). The Federal Grant Administrator will then complete the Grant Adjustment Notice (GAN) to close out the grant process.

2005 Project Budget

The proposed 2005 Project Budget was presented to the First Responders Advisory Committee and Iowa Homeland Security in December of 2004. The budget will be reviewed and adjustments made based on equipment that may have been acquired from other funding sources or improvements in technology or changes in needs are identified.

Task Force participation in training and exercises will cause some use of consumable materials and equipment, that can be used in future training and exercise activities. However many of the consumables will need to be replenished in order to be prepared for actual responses. While it is not intended, we may have some equipment that needs to be repaired as a result of the learning and exercise activities, when the limitations of the equipment are tested and defined.

Significant changes in the program budget will be proposed to Iowa Homeland Security to be channeled to through the appropriate review process, prior to making the expenditure.

2005 Equipment Specifications

The 2004 SHSGP Program funds were used to bring all of the squads up to an acceptable level consistency across the board. The FY 2005 SHSGP Program funds will be used to increase the level of capability of all of the bomb squads across the state to respond to terrorist events. While much of the equipment has already been identified and specifications developed, we may identify additional equipment needs as we attempt to integrate response with regional tactical and hazardous materials teams.

2005 Equipment Purchasing

Will be consistent with the purchasing strategies that were developed and refined during the FY 2004 SHSGP purchasing activities. It is our intent to maximize the use of state and federal GSA contracts to expedite the purchasing process and achieve the most cost effective pricing.

2005 Training

The major portion of the individual, team, joint, regional and statewide training and exercises will be funded from the 2005 Budget. This will also involve the use of backfill funding to the participating agencies to compensate for the significant commitment of personnel as we develop the higher level of response capability.

2005 Final Reporting

Final reports to the U. S. Department of Homeland Security are due within 120 days of the end of the grant period (June 30, 2007). The Task Force Leadership

Committee will cooperate with Iowa Homeland Security (State Administrative Agency) to fulfill the reporting requirements to include the Financial Status Report (FSR) and the Biannual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR). The Federal Grant Administrator will then complete the Grant Adjustment Notice (GAN) to close out the grant process.

Future Funding

The National Bomb Squad Commander's Advisory Board met and issued a ruling that each accredited bomb squad must have its' own robotics platform by the FY2009 accreditation cycle. The use of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between squads for sharing of a common robotics platform was not acceptable. We are still waiting for a description of what constitutes a "bomb robot" by definition. In order to maintain the current bomb response capacity in Iowa, we may need to purchase two to three additional robots.

Technology projects are underway to develop electronic countermeasures to defend against radio controlled improvised explosive devices and vehicle borne devices, as well as improved detection equipment for CBRNE materials. New national guidelines will be developed this summer to combat the threat of suicide (homicide) bombers, which may include additional equipment or training requirements.

While national standards and accreditation requirements have value and are desired by many, they can also become quite burdensome. An additional round of funding from FY2006 SHSGP will be required to keep up with federal requirements and the increasing technology being deployed by terrorists.

Budget

IOWA BOMB SQUAD TASK FORCE BUDGET SHSGP FY2004					
EQUIPMENT AND RELATED ITEMS					
AEL	ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION	UNIT COST	QTY.	TOTAL COST
2.2.7	1	Remotec Andros 6A Multifunction Robotics Platforms Quote 4305-2	\$208,417.00	3	\$625,251.00
12.3	2	Wells Cargo 12 Foot X 6 Foot Enclosed Trailers for Robotics Platforms	\$5,327.57	3	\$15,982.71
2.2.8	3	Existing Remotec Andros 6A Multifunction Robotics Platform Upgrades	\$61,775.00	2	\$123,550.00
2.1.1.1	4	MED-ENG EOD-9 Suits, with Helmets, WMD Expansion Kit, Hand Protection	\$19,617.00	8	\$156,936.00
1.1.1.1	5	Self Contained Breathing Apparatus compatible with bomb suit operations	\$4,000.00	8	\$32,000.00
2.2.11	6	Advantage Hook & Line Kit	\$5,000.00	8	\$40,000.00
	7				\$0.00
	8				\$0.00
	9				\$0.00
	10				\$0.00
	11				\$0.00
	12				\$0.00
		Subtotal Equipment and Related Items			\$993,719.71
TRAINING AND RELATED ITEMS					
		Delivery & Training for 2 Technicians Per Robotics Platform	\$900.00	3	\$2,700.00
		Robotics Disrupter Ammunition and Supplies for Robotics Training	\$200.00	8	\$1,600.00
		Subtotal Training and Related Items			\$4,300.00
EXERCISES AND RELATED COSTS					
		Fall 2005 Task Force Meeting (Estimate 20 Participants)	\$50.00	20	\$1,000.00
		Bomb Task Forces to continue to participate in local training and exercises			
		Subtotal Exercises and Related Items			\$1,000.00
BACKFILL AND RELATED COSTS					
		No backfill costs until training and exercises begin with SHSGP FY2005			
		Subtotal Backfill and Related Costs			
GRAND TOTAL SHSGP FY 2004					\$999,019.71

Bomb Suit

MED-ENG EOD 9 Suit Large	\$11,489.00
MED-ENG EOD 9 Helmet with APS	\$6,530.00
MED-ENG EOD 9 BA (Breathing Apparatus Adaptor)	\$1,227.00
MED-ENG Hand Protectors W/Gloves	\$371.00
	<hr/>
	\$19,617.00

DSM	State	Robotics Platforms and Upgrades	
		Andros 6 A Robot with features	\$176,945.00
\$3,596.00		Add Real-Time X-ray Assembly	\$3,596.00
\$1,397.00		Add Contamination Smear Assembly	\$1,397.00
\$299.00		Add Window Breaker Assembly	\$299.00
\$416.00		Cable Cutter Assembly	\$416.00
\$764.00		Cordless Drill Assembly	\$764.00
\$4,455.00		Arm Pan Tilt Camera Assembly M2450-5030	

IOWA BOMB SQUAD TASK FORCE BUDGET SHSGP FY2005					
EQUIPMENT AND RELATED ITEMS					
AEL	ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION	UNIT COST	QTY.	TOTAL COST
2.2.7	1	Mini Robotics Platforms	\$100,000.00	4	\$400,000.00
2.2.12	2	Logos Quad Speed Digital Imaging System (X-ray)	\$20,610.00	8	\$164,880.00
2.2.4	3	Fiber Optic Scopes	\$20,000.00	8	\$160,000.00
	4	Local Squad Needs (Cooling Vests, SCBA, Dosimeters, CRBN Monitors)	\$17,800.00	8	\$142,400.00
	5				\$0.00
	6				\$0.00
	7				\$0.00
	8				\$0.00
	9				\$0.00
	10				\$0.00
	11				\$0.00
	12				\$0.00
		Subtotal Equipment and Related Items			\$867,280.00
TRAINING AND RELATED ITEMS					
		Individual and Team Training on New Equipment X 8 Teams	\$1,500.00	8	\$12,000.00
		Joint Training and Conference X 40 Bomb Technicians	\$800.00	40	\$32,000.00
		Statewide Multi-discipline / Multi-jurisdictional Training X Each Quarter	\$2,500.00	4	\$10,000.00
					\$0.00
		Subtotal Training and Related Items			\$54,000.00
EXERCISES AND RELATED COSTS					
		Expendables (X-ray film, disupter rounds, explosives, fuel) X 8 Teams	\$500.00	8	\$4,000.00
		40 Technicians X 16 Hours X 26.50 Per Hour	40X16X26.50		\$16,960.00
		Lodging 2 Nights X 40 Technicians X \$45.00	2X40X45.00		\$3,600.00
		3 Days X 40 Technicians X 34.00 Per Diem	3X40X34.00		\$4,080.00
		Subtotal Exercises and Related Items			\$28,640.00
BACKFILL AND RELATED COSTS					
		40 Technicians X 32 Hours X \$40 (Time and one half)	40X32X40		\$51,200.00
					\$0.00
		Subtotal Backfill and Related Costs			\$51,200.00
GRAND TOTAL SHSGP FY 2005					\$1,001,120.00

**IOWA BOMB SQUAD TASK FORCE
28 E AGREEMENT**

I. PURPOSE

This agreement is entered into this _____ day of _____, 2005, by and between the State of Iowa, the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, hereinafter referred to as the State, and the (Jurisdiction Name) hereinafter referred to as the Sponsoring Organization. The purpose of this document is to delineate responsibilities and procedures for bomb squad activities under the authority of the State of Iowa, the Department of Public Defense, Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division.

II. SCOPE

The provisions of this agreement apply only to Iowa Bomb Squad Task Force activities performed while training, exercising, or during emergency responses initiated by the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division. Details concerning specific working relationships may be appended to this document as they are developed. Addendums to this agreement must have written approval of all parties and must be attached to this document.

III. APPLICATION

- a. *The Sponsoring Organization agrees to participate as a sponsoring organization of Iowa's Bomb Squad Task Force. The Sponsoring Organizations will provide resources to support Iowa's Bomb Squad Task Force.*
- b. *This agreement is intended to improve bomb squad response capabilities and capacities within the State of Iowa. Under this agreement the Sponsoring Organization agrees to deploy **to a declared incident** for bomb squad missions or in support of other terrorist response activities, when formally requested under the provisions of Paragraph VI. Procedures.*
- c. *Operational equipment required by such missions and activities will be purchased using any available funds. Procurement of operational equipment will directly improve capabilities for providing suspect device evaluation, render-safe operations, disposal of explosive materials and response to other technical incidents such as chemical, biological, or radiological events. Additional funds for training and equipping personnel will be part of this agreement.*
- d. *This agreement is intended to cover activities associated with training, exercises and the actual deployment of Iowa's Bomb Squad Task Force.*

IV. DEFINITIONS

- a. ***Activation:** the process of deploying Task Force assets and members on an emergency response to a designated site. For the purposes of this agreement, activation means the time from deployment until the Sponsoring Organization personnel and equipment returns to the Point of Departure.*
- b. ***Alert:** the process of informing Sponsoring Agencies that an emergency has occurred and that activation of Task Force assets may be imminent.*
- c. ***Bomb Squad:** **federally accredited squad employing** specialized tactics, personnel, and equipment suited to suspect device evaluation, render-safe operations, disposal*

of explosive materials and response to other technical incidents such as chemical, biological or radiological events.

- d. Bomb Squad Task Force Division: a Bomb Squad or Squads from Sponsoring Organizations assigned to an incident.
- e. Bomb Squad Task Force Leader: an individual responsible for team training, equipment maintenance, mobilization, tactical direction and field command of a Bomb Squad Task Force or Division.
- f. Deployment: encompasses all activities performed while training, exercising, or during emergency responses initiated or sanctioned by the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division.
- g. Emergency Response: the activation and deployment of Task Force personnel and assets to a designated site. Task Force activities shall be considered to be related to an emergency response until such time as all Task Force personnel and assets return to their point of departure.
- h. HLSEM: Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division.
- i. Incident Commander: the individual in-charge of coordinating response activities within the event site; under normal circumstances this individual will be an emergency responder from the local community responsible for the incident activities including the development and implementation of strategic decisions and for approving the allocation of resources.
- j. Iowa Bomb Squad Task Force (IBSTF): the Iowa Bomb Squad Task Force consisting of an integrated collection of personnel and equipment meeting standardized capability criteria for addressing the special needs of suspect device evaluation, render-safe operations, disposal of explosive materials and technical assistance for chemical, biological, or radiological events. The Iowa Bomb Squad Task force is comprised of all participating signatories (jurisdictions), along with the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division.
- k. Mobilization: the process for activating, assembling and transporting the resources that have been requested to respond in support of an incident.
- l. ODP: The Office of Domestic Preparedness that was part of the Department of Justice but was incorporated into the new Department of Homeland Security.
- m. On-site MOU: a written document that outlines the mission and specific objectives of that mission.
- n. Operational Equipment: that equipment which is required for safe and efficacious Task Force operations. Examples of such equipment may be found by reference in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Special Technicians Bulletin "STB 87-4 " National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians" or recommendations from the National Bomb Squad Commander's Advisory Board (NBSCAB).
- o. Out of Pocket Expense: an expense incurred by an individual necessary for response. i.e. housing, meals.
- p. Personal Equipment: that equipment which is brought by the task force member for personal support. This equipment is not included in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Special Technicians Bulletin "STB 87-4 " National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians" or recommendations from the National Bomb Squad Commander's Advisory Board (NBSCAB), but is taken by the task force member to support his/her own self-sufficiency requirements.
- q. Point of Departure: the pre-determined location at which Task Force personnel and assets are to assemble in order to prepare deployment, and to deploy from.
- r. State: the State of Iowa, or any department, agency or bureau of the State of Iowa in which the Sponsoring Organization reports or corresponds.

V. RESPONSIBILITIES

- a. **HLSEM shall be responsible for:**

1. *Coordination between the State of Iowa, sponsoring organizations, local jurisdiction, and other relevant governmental and private parties.*
 2. *Providing funding and technical support for equipment and training. The parties shall understand that funding may be restricted, limited, qualified, or otherwise dependent and/or contingent on future funding sources. When acquisitioning equipment the Task Force will use the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Special Technicians Bulletin "STB 87-4 " National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians" or recommendations from the National Bomb Squad Commander's Advisory Board (NBSCAB), as benchmark guidance whenever practical. Use of this equipment will be for HLSEM-sanctioned response activities, training which is directly related to Bomb Squad Task Force missions and emergencies within the Sponsoring Agencies jurisdictions that may necessitate the use of such equipment. Operational equipment, within the custody of a Task Force Division, may be used in their own jurisdiction for non-sanctioned response. The Task Force Division will be accountable for operational equipment and will assure that equipment is operationally ready for deployment, if requested by HLSEM.*
 3. *Out-of-pocket expenses for team members deployed to an event, such as housing and meals, limited according to the provisions found in Section VII, c & d.*
 4. *Maintaining 24-hour alert capabilities, including a point-of-contact or duty officer available at all times.*
 5. *Implementing the Iowa Bomb Squad Task Force's alert and activation procedure when called upon to do so.*
 6. *Providing additional support resources that the State may possess and making these forms of assistance available to the deployed Bomb Squad Task Force, if available.*
 7. *Replacement and/or rehabilitation of damaged or destroyed equipment used in the course of the operations subject to the availability of funds.*
 8. *In conjunction with Sponsoring Organizations, creation of appropriate Standard Operating Procedures for activation, mobilization and demobilization.*
- b. *The Sponsoring Organizations shall be responsible for:***
1. *Maintaining a Bomb Squad Task Force Division, using the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Special Technicians Bulletin "STB 87-4 " National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians" or recommendations from the National Bomb Squad Commander's Advisory Board (NBSCAB) as guidance.*
 2. *Under the procedures outlined in this agreement, the Sponsoring Organization agrees to timely respond to a formal activation request made by the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division. Activated Task Force resources will deploy within one hour. Once operational, Task Force Resources will provide assistance to jurisdictions that have made a formal request through the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division. If conditions warrant Federal assets, Iowa Bomb Squad Task Force resources will continue to provide assistance until Federal resources are operational.*
 3. *Implementing Iowa's Bomb Squad Task Force's alert and activation procedure when called upon to do so.*
 4. *Providing training to Task Force members as funding from the HLSEM permits. Training should be consistent with the objectives of upgrading, developing and renewing skills as needed to maintain qualifications. Incidents shall be managed utilizing the Incident Command/ Unified Command System consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS).*

5. *Developing, practicing and implementing an internal call-out system for its members.*
6. *Administrative, financial, and personnel management as they relate to the Task Force. All original paperwork will be filed at the sponsoring Organization, with copies provided to HLSEM.*
7. *Developing, maintaining, and overall accountability for Bomb Squad Task Force operational equipment*
8. *Providing operational equipment for Bomb Squad Task Force related activities, as agreed upon with the State of Iowa, subject to the availability of such Task Force personnel and equipment which will be based upon requirements and priorities of the local jurisdiction and the State at the time such personnel and equipment are requested.*
9. *If a disciplinary issue arises the Sponsoring Organization will have full oversight and responsibility for personnel within its Division.*
10. *In conjunction with HLSEM, creation of appropriate Standard Operating Procedures for activation, mobilization and demobilization.*

VI. PROCEDURES

a. Activation

1. *Upon request from HLSEM for bomb response assistance, and/or determination by HLSEM that pre-positioning Bomb Squad Task Force assets is prudent, HLSEM shall request the activation of resources necessary to respond to the emergency or situation.*
2. *When mobilization is necessary, activation notices shall be communicated by HLSEM to the identified Task Force Leader.*
3. *A Certified Bomb Technician or Bomb Squad Task Force Commander shall have the ability to initiate an immediate activation of a Bomb Squad Task Force Division for response, however such initiation must be followed as soon as practical, with notification of HLSEM Duty Officer. Failure to follow through with the notification of the HLSEM Duty Officer, may impact the ability for the Sponsoring Organization or Requesting Jurisdiction to receive compensation of expenses incurred, from the State.*

b. Mobilization, Deployment, and Redeployment

1. *The Task Force Leader shall notify Division members of HLSEM initiated activation.*
2. *The Task Force will be ready for deployment within one hour after activation by HLSEM.*

VII. FINANCIAL AGREEMENTS

- a. *Upon deployment, all personnel of the Sponsoring Organization shall be compensated through HLSEM in accordance with the sponsoring organization's pay schedules and policies.*
- b. *HLSEM shall agree to make task force participants, not employed by the Sponsoring Organization, but acting under the authority of the Sponsoring Organization, an employee of the State pursuant to Chapter 669, Section 669.21 of the Code of Iowa. Furthermore, Disability, Worker's Compensation and Death Benefits shall be paid by the State of Iowa in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Code of Iowa, Chapters 97A, 97B, 410, 411& 85 respectively, to those members to whom these codes apply.*
- c. *Upon deployment, Sponsoring Organization members shall be reimbursed for travel and per diem costs in accordance with the Sponsoring Organization's travel regulations, unless otherwise authorized.*

- d. *Upon deployment, Sponsoring Organization members shall be reimbursed for reasonable out of pocket expenses within the limits established for the Sponsoring Organization's employees.*
- e. *Upon deployment, Sponsoring Organization Personnel expenses including back fill costs for deployed personnel shall be submitted to HLSEM for reimbursement, and may be reimbursed to the Sponsoring Organization by the State of Iowa. (As this Program matures and additional funding sources are pursued and secured, and eligibility for expenses are detailed, effort will be made by the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division to address the issue of personnel expenses through an amendment to this agreement.)*
- f. *Sponsoring Organization materials, equipment, mileage expenses and supplies consumed in providing requested assistance shall be reimbursed on a replacement basis. Replacement and/or rehabilitation requests shall be submitted to HLSEM by each Sponsoring Organization before demobilization or as soon as practically possible, thereafter.*
- g. *Rehabilitation or replacement costs of operational equipment will be reimbursed if the piece of equipment was used for training, exercises, or emergency response, as authorized by HLSEM. HLSEM will consider on a case-by-case basis the replacement of lost or stolen equipment.*
- h. *No Task Force Division, nor any Task Force member, shall be reimbursed for costs incurred by activity outside the scope of this agreement.*
- i. *All equipment purchased under this agreement will revert to the local Sponsoring Organization according the procedure outline of Paragraph IX. (e) of this agreement.*

VIII. REPORTING & GRANT REQUIREMENTS

- a. *The Sponsoring Organization will submit, in writing, to HLSEM all personnel changes as they relate to the composition of their Division of the Task Force. This includes information of personnel training and qualification upgrades as well as associated information relevant to new member(s) that are admitted to positions on the Task Force.*
- b. *Verification of Task Force member credentials will be submitted on an annual basis and at other times as requested by HLSEM*
- c. *The Sponsoring Organization will submit semi-annual financial and activity reports to HLSEM. Both HLSEM and the Sponsoring Organization shall mutually agree upon the format of the reports.*
- d. *The Sponsoring Organization shall have a control system in effect to ensure adequate safeguards to prevent loss, damage, or theft of the property. HLSEM will be promptly notified of any loss, damage, or theft of property related to Task Force acquisitions using federal or state funding provided for Task Force operations. All such occurrences shall be investigated and fully documented by the Sponsoring Organization.*
- e. *The Sponsoring Organization shall have in place Standard Operating Procedures that outline procedures to be followed to keep the property in good condition. In the event a piece of equipment becomes damaged or obsolete and it is no longer cost-effective to repair or upgrade that particular piece of equipment, the item may be replaced through trade-in or sale and subsequent purchase of new property. The Sponsoring Organization must request a letter of approval from HLSEM, prior to entering into negotiation for the replacement or trade-in of the property. The approval letter from HLSEM to the Sponsoring Organization will not be unreasonably withheld or delayed.*
- f. *The Sponsoring Organization shall permit the Auditor of the State of Iowa or any authorized representative of the State and where federal funds are involved, the*

Comptroller General of the United States or any other authorized representative of the United States government, to access and examine, audit, excerpt and transcribe any directly pertinent books, documents, papers, electronic or optically stored and created records or other records of the Sponsoring Organization relating to orders, invoices or payments or any other documentation or materials pertaining to this Contract, wherever such records may be located. The Sponsoring Organization shall not impose a charge for audit or examination of its books and records.

- g. *The Sponsoring Organization, its employees and agents shall comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, rules, ordinances, regulations and orders when performing the services under this Contract, including without limitation, all laws applicable to the prevention of discrimination in employment and the use of targeted small businesses or suppliers. The Sponsoring Organization, its employee and agents shall also comply with all federal, state and local laws regarding business permits and licenses that may be required to carry out the work performed under this Contract.*

IX. CONDITIONS, AMENDMENTS AND TERMINATION

a. **Amendments:**

This Agreement may be modified or amended only with written agreement of all parties; all amendments will be attached to this agreement.

b. **Conditions:**

Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be construed to compel the sponsoring organization to respond to any request for mobilization and deployment when the division members are, in the opinion of the Sponsoring Organization, required to perform emergency services in their own jurisdiction.

c. **Termination:**

- 1. The memorandum may be terminated by any party upon 30 days written notice.*
- 2. If diminished funding creates the inability to maintain appropriate training levels, jeopardizes maintenance of equipment, or compromises the overall safety of Task Force members, then this agreement will be eligible for termination by the Sponsoring Organization.*
- 3. If the Sponsoring Organization terminates the contract for reasons not related to funding levels and/or support from the HLSEM, or the Sponsoring Organization is unable to fulfill the obligations outlined in this agreement, then HLSEM has the authority to redistribute equipment purchased as part of this agreement that has not reverted to the Sponsoring Organization to another Sponsoring Organization to build Bomb Squad capacity.*
- 4. If HLSEM terminates this agreement for any reason then all equipment purchased as part of this agreement that has not yet reverted to the Sponsoring Organization shall become the property of the Sponsoring Organization upon completion of the grant period.*
- 5. If this agreement is terminated all parties will be subject to the same requirements regarding audit; record keeping, and submission of reports for any open grant period.*

d. **Renewal:**

Starting in 2008, triennially, the parties will review this Agreement. Participants will decide if the existing agreement is functional and if any necessary modifications exist. At this time the parties shall determine if the agreement shall be renewed.

e. **Property upon Cancellation:**

Under terms of the ODP Program, equipment belongs to the State of Iowa for the length of the grant's performance period and then reverts to the Sponsoring Organization it was procured for. Since the equipment is purchased with federal funds, it must be used with the intent for which it was originally purchased which is

Bomb Squad and Terrorism Response. If this Contract is terminated by HLSEM before the two-year grant period is up, the equipment will be retained as property of the State of Iowa but will continue to be used by the Sponsoring Organization. At the end of the grant's performance period, it is understood the equipment will become the property of the Sponsoring Organization.

f. Liability:

1. *A member of a Task Force Division when performing, or carrying out, the Sponsoring Organizations responsibilities under this agreement, or pursuant to a Governor's Disaster Proclamation as provided in Section 29C.6; is an employee of the state under Chapter 669, and shall be afforded protection as an employee of the State under Section 669.21.*
2. *For the purposes of disability, and death benefits, Task Force Members shall be considered performing within the scope of their employment with the Sponsoring Organization with benefits paid under the provisions of Iowa Code Chapters 97A, 97B, 410 and 411. The State shall reimburse the Public Safety Peace Officers Retirement, Accident, and Disability System, the Iowa Public Employees' Retirement System (IPERS), or the Municipal Fire and Police Retirement System of Iowa for any additional expenses incurred as a result of the injuries. The State will also reimburse the Sponsoring Organization for any and all expenses it may incur as a result of any injuries to Task Force Members.*
3. *The State shall reimburse any third party payer of benefits paid to an injured civilian task force member under Iowa Code Chapters 85 or 86. If an injured Task Force Member is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits, the state will pay the injured Task Force Member such benefits, as he/she would have otherwise been entitled to under Iowa Code Chapters 85 and 86.*
4. *Compensation for members will be consistent with VII (a) and (b), respectively.*

g. Concept of Operation:

The concept of operations for Iowa's Bomb Squad Task Force is to provide assistance to local, state and federal jurisdictions when these entities have been overwhelmed by a suspect improvised explosive device, explosive materials or technical assistance is requested as related to a chemical, biological, radiological or active shooter event. A hallmark asset of this team is the ability to provide statewide bomb and terrorism response capabilities. Iowa's Bomb Squad Task Force resources may only be activated as stated in Paragraph VI. Procedures. Each Task Force Division may be deployed singularly, or as part of a collective response. If an event escalates and requires Federal assets, Iowa's Bomb Squad Task Force resources will continue to provide assistance until federal assets are operational at the site of the incident. Under this concept, resources may be active for a period of up to three days.

h. Command at the Incident Site:

Events shall be managed using the Incident Command / Unified Command System for command, control and communications in accordance with NIMS. It is understood that the resources from the Sponsoring Organization shall report to the Incident Commander and coordinate incident activities with the designated operations officer or personnel identified by the incident commander as having these duties and responsibilities. Concurrently, an evaluation of the incident by the on-scene Division(s) will be conducted. This assessment will indicate the need for additional Iowa Bomb Squad Task Force resources. All additional requests for resources will be coordinated with the designated officer of the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division.

The incident commander, or his/her designee, will assign Bomb Squad related missions to responding Bomb Squad Task Force Divisions. Iowa's Bomb Squad Task Force Divisions will then act on those missions, as long as those missions are safe and within the capabilities of the Task Force. It is the responsibility of the Bomb Squad Task Force member in charge to monitor and ensure the safety of its personnel and equipment. The Bomb Squad Task Force will provide technical advice when appropriate, but will not be expected to assume command of the incident.

i. **Disengagement:**

When the Incident Commander, Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, and the designated representative of the Iowa Bomb Squad Task Force agree that the mission of the team has been achieved or deployment of the team is no longer necessary, the Task Force Division members will be released from the event site, allowing resources to return to their respective jurisdictions. Operational and disengagement benchmarks will be clearly communicated by use of an on-site memorandum of understanding.

j. **Other:**

The Sponsoring Organization agrees to comply with the all-applicable City, State and Federal provisions regarding personnel policy. The Sponsoring Organization will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment on the grounds of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. In addition, use of facilities, supplies and services will be in compliance with all City, State and Federal regulations guaranteeing nondiscrimination. Provision of technical assistance and other relief and assistance activities shall be accomplished in an equitable and impartial manner, without discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, nationality, sex, age, or economic status.

VIII. 28 E Requirements

- a. This agreement shall last until terminated by any party as allowed in Paragraph IX.C.
- b. No separate legal or administrative entity will be created.
- c. The budget for support of Iowa's Bomb Squad Task Force shall be prepared by HLSEM.

IX. ATTACHMENTS

- a. Reserved
- b. Reserved

Signed for the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division:


David Miller
Administrator & Homeland Security Advisor

Signed for the (Sponsoring Jurisdiction):

(Enter Name)
(Enter Title & Jurisdiction Name)

Map

Proposed EOD Response Capacity for WMD/Terrorism Incidents



EOD Task Force Meeting Notes

**EOD Task Force
December 15, 2004 ■ 1:00 – 4:00 pm
Cedar Rapids Police Department ■ Sunner Classroom
505 First Street SW ■ Cedar Rapids**

Task Force Members Present

Gary Anderson, Appanoose County Sheriff
John Chipman, Marion PD
Brent Cirksena, Waterloo PD
Bob Hagist, Cedar Rapids PD
Matt Johnson, Iowa City PD
Mike Keefe, State Fire Marshall's Office, Clear Lake
Jim Kenkel, State Fire Marshall, Des Moines
Len Murray, Des Moines PD
Brian Weldon, Waterloo PD
Mel Williams, Sioux City PD
Mike Zlatohlavek, Linn County Sheriff's Office

SPPG Staff

Jennifer Furler
Arlinda McKeen
Rachel Scott

Welcome and Introductions

Jim Kenkel welcomed the group and offered an overview of items to be considered by the Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Task Force. He explained that the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) funding comes from the Department of Homeland Security to the state to support state and local homeland security activities. Eighty percent of this money must be passed on by the state for local use; twenty percent is reserved for the state's direct costs. Of the 80%, a portion has been retained and designated for statewide efforts in five areas: USAR, SWAT, Bomb, Veterinary Rapid Response, and HazMat. The remainder of the local funds will be distributed to the six regions based on a formula developed earlier in the year.

The mission of the EOD Task Force is to develop the capacity for statewide and regional EOD response, recommend how regions will be designated, and determine how EOD funding will be distributed and spent. Exercises, training and equipment should all be addressed with this money.

In discussions regarding EOD response and funding held earlier in the year, consensus was reached on several issues. The Task Force was asked to revisit these briefly and confirm that there was still consensus.

- The FBI provides training standards so other standards need not be developed.
- The FBI recommends that no new EOD squads be established due to training backlogs.
- The FBI has mandated that any new EOD squads have a robot; existing squads must have one by 2009.
- Regional squads might only respond statewide to WMD events.

In the earlier work group, consensus was not reached in other areas, including:

- Location of teams
- Role of 28E agreements and MOUs
- Team size standards
- Response standards
- Responsibility for liability, insurance, overtime, lodging, etc.
- Possibility of consequences of not responding
- Which teams are willing to participate and respond
- Specific uses of funding

Kenkel emphasized that these decisions must be made by local agencies on behalf of local agencies. It is not the place of the state agency to make these determinations. The state needed assistance in moving the decision-making process forward. State Public Policy Group, Inc. (SPPG), a professional facilitator, was retained to assist the Task Force in taking this effort to the next level and finalizing the work. There is a tight timeline for the Task Force to reach consensus and get buy-in from other decision makers because the FY 04 funding cycle will expire.

Role of State Public Policy Group

Arlinda McKeen introduced herself and staff and explained the work SPPG does across the state. SPPG is happy to participate and to convene the members of the Task Force. There will be a focus on local decision making and making sure that decisions will work well with various constituencies and stakeholders. The State Fire Marshals Office's role is to be a part of the decision making process as a stakeholder that provides local services, but not to make the decisions for the local stakeholders.

Len Murray lends some extra expertise as a member of the First Responders Advisory Committee (FRAC), a committee of stakeholders who is charged with making recommendations on various issues to the Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division (HLSEM). Murray explained the make-up of

FRAC and its role in statewide discussions. It should be understood that FRAC is looking at a wider WMD response capability across the state—not at putting anyone out of business. With funding considerations, some regionalization efforts seem necessary to make the best possible use of the funding. FRAC is looking for regular updates from the previously-mentioned groups to demonstrate what their funding is used for.

Kenkel also noted that on the federal level, Iowa is getting huge documents with short turn around for the purpose of reporting progress. For instance, recently, Iowa was given five days to report on EOD progress. In such a short turn around, Kenkel was forced to make quick decisions and identify equipment that is needed based on current priorities. These estimations of equipment and training needs can be revised if needed. This is a crucial process to demonstrate to the federal government that this money is well spent. Federal funding for FY 05 can be spent on x-ray processors, mini-robots, bomb suits, replacement helmets, fiber optic kits, rigging kits, hand tool kits, training and backfill, among other things.

The history of the earlier EOD resource group was briefly discussed. McKeen described the role of the Sioux City PD and the Appanoose Sheriff's County Office as representatives of municipalities without bomb squads, but jurisdictions impacted by the decisions regarding regional response because of their reliance on the Iowa State Patrol's role as backup to any local jurisdiction requesting such assistance.

It was clarified that the role of this EOD Task Force effort is to ensure statewide WMD EOD response—not day-to-day response. Regional response is already in place from State Fire Marshall EOD techs. McKeen asked for contact information and suggested that members send a surrogate to any Task Force meeting that they must miss.

An EOD Task Force binder was distributed in which members can keep all of the information from this process. This process emphasizes transparency, so members should feel free to pass on information to those who need to see it. It would be ideal to keep decision makers informed so they are as prepared as possible when the group decides it is time to get commitment and consensus from leadership.

Overview of the Process

SPPG has prepared for this effort by collecting some background information through interviews. Ultimately, the Task Force will assemble recommendations or a proposal for policy makers and administrators in February. At that time, SPPG will conduct outreach meetings across the state to ensure that local officials hear about the recommendations and get a chance to provide input.

Providing opportunities for people to ask questions will reduce the level of anxiety they feel about changes and will ultimately create better policy. After the outreach effort, the Task Force will reconvene and make necessary revisions. A final report will be given to Commissioner Techau in May 2005.

McKeen informed the Task Force that SPPG would also be handling the tactical officers effort. SPPG will work toward representing all of these messages to state-level policy makers and legislators through local outreach. SPPG has conducted past work in the state's study of jail infrastructure, juvenile justice, and other related issues, as well as Johnson County's jail task force.

McKeen encouraged the members to speak forthrightly, but to expect that everyone must also expect to compromise in some areas. As this boils down to a funding issue, some tough decisions must be made.

Previous Efforts and Framework

Task Force members who served on the previous EOD group reported on progress made in those discussions.

The FBI is requesting that no new bomb squads be created anywhere in the country. Iowa has eight accredited bomb squads:

- Council Bluffs PD/Pottawattamie County SO,
- Des Moines PD,
- Waterloo PD,
- Cedar Rapids PD,
- Linn County SO/Marion PD,
- Iowa City PD/Johnson County SO/Coralville PD/ (U of I-with potential for the future),
- Davenport PD/Scott County SO, and
- State Fire Marshals Office (9 regions/10 techs).
 - Council Bluffs, Denison, Spencer, Clear Lake, Osceola, Mt. Pleasant, Cedar Rapids, Waterloo/Cedar Falls, Des Moines

Right now, there is a waiting period to access basic bomb training and recertification. Previously, the FBI paid for tech training, but now local departments must pay for the initial 5-week training. The FBI pays the cost of recertification. Existing bomb squads have until 2009 to get a robot. The squads are weighted heavily in eastern Iowa, having been created in response to incidents and funded by LEA grants in the 1970s.

For the most part, the difficulty is not with the technicians cooperating with each other to respond to an incident. It is almost always the "city fathers," administrators and policy makers who are concerned about the expense, liability, and internal needs in the event of a call for response outside of their own

jurisdiction. City and county attorneys add another layer of hesitancy and decision-making. IMAC (Iowa Mutual Aid Compact, developed by HLSEM) might be a solution to this problem, if counties and cities sign. If IMAC is signed, liability is covered. True costs of call-outs must be assessed to ensure that the summoning jurisdiction is made responsible for them. Until these cities agree to the IMAC, there can be no true regional response capacity. The 28Es create a money battle in a lot of cases—again, not the officers or the techs.

What will the response standards/triggers be for a regional/joint response? How do you decide if something is a terrorist event versus a “day to day” event?

- Flags or triggers can be developed by this group to help with those decisions. A Governor’s Declaration would be one of the triggers, but decision-making needs to be streamlined. There is a tendency for every group to think they need to be involved. Working through HLSEM is one way to get outside response, but sometimes the departments just handle it themselves. The resulting protocol must be practical for the situations and departments that need it.
- Triggers may be: multiple bombs; Oklahoma City, WTC-type incidents; suspected suicide bombers; when local resources are overwhelmed; or long duration events.
- The local first responders—not the EMCs or some state-level person second-guessing—must make most of the decisions. There is more likelihood for a smaller event to escalate than for a banner event to occur.
- The trigger for a response is based on an agent’s determination of risk. These issues are really very simple. If a bomb tech is overwhelmed, he will need others to respond. Most likely, there will be no “big event” in our lifetime.

One person expressed that chiefs should be brought in on this process immediately to discuss IMAC. Cedar Rapids only has 28E agreements with Linn and Johnson counties and has very limited potential to respond farther than that.

It was asked if there was a possibility to respond based on a template like the 28E agreements signed by 19 counties for the Meth Lab Task Force? Bomb techs use different criteria for decision-making than do chiefs and sheriffs.

What are the consequences if a regional team or members of a regional team do not respond to an incident?

- Equipment will be used on a day-to-day basis. Many will say it is not fair to allow a city to use the equipment if they will not agree to respond outside their area. The equipment is the “carrot.” But this would need to be based upon yearly funding to increase interest in participating.
- There should be agreement on definitions and protocols—not loopholes that allow cities to find reasons not to respond to an incident when they

have already received the equipment. It seems obvious that the person who is highly trained on the equipment must respond with it and allow other groups in the region an opportunity to train with the equipment.

Turf issues. Cedar Rapids and Linn County described reasons for each having their own teams. They train together, but don't feel the need to combine because the demand in each jurisdiction requires a trained team. Taxpayers are hesitant to invest their money (in regional response capacity) helping people in another area.

State's role. Some say the state is trying to ease their burden by shifting responsibility for decision making to local municipalities and squads. This effort is not about shifting responsibility; it is an opportunity for those at the local level to make important decisions about EOD response and funding priorities. In this case DPS is very sensitive to the desire of local jurisdictions to make decisions and recommendations that affect them, while also participating as an entity with a state mandate to provide local back-up support statewide.

Robots. The sharing of robots across regions was discussed. One example: can the robot be used in Sioux City if the situation is not a terrorist event, considering that the robot is in Council Bluffs and they will not respond? Significant training is required to use the robot. SWAT and HazMat will also have a need and interest in using the robot. Other groups can share the robot, but use would have to be supervised by the bomb tech with experience using the robot. It would not be wise to just "send it off" without the expertise of the robot tech who has specialized training.

Area of Focus for the EOD Task Force

▪ Current status as starting point

The Task Force reached consensus that response will be limited to a major terrorist incident and when responding units' resources and/or personnel are overwhelmed, according to the determination of the incident commander.

A top priority will be purchasing robots, but each tech should have a certified suit. Squads may also want to upgrade x-ray machines. The Task Force may want to consider using funds to upgrade all squads to the same level. A survey of exiting equipment and inventory is needed.

Accredited squads must have:

- Disruptor
- X-ray machine
- Bomb suit
- Demolition kit with tools

If the money is divided among the existing eight accredited squads, each will get \$125,000, which will not be enough to purchase a robot. Regionalization and cross-jurisdictional partnerships should be seriously considered to increase the pool of money given to each – this will be a major topic of discussion at the next Task Force meeting.

Identify Remaining Issues

To receive the money, should squads have to sign on to IMAC?

The Task Force reached consensus that this should be a condition.

Should any standards be added in addition to FBI and NBSCAB standards?

Kenkel suggested that joint/regional training should be considered to increase the ability of techs to work together in the event that statewide response was needed. Again, FBI certification must be renewed every three years, but there is a significant training backlog. Techs have a grace period if they have made an effort to renew their certification and are on the waiting list. Eight to sixteen hours are needed each month for ongoing training; the FBI recommends 16 hours each month. Kenkel reminded the group that part of the \$1 million must be used for training and exercises.

Preliminary Consensus Items

The Task Force reached preliminary consensus on the following issues:

- Regional/joint response will be limited to a major terrorist incident and when responding units' resources and/or personnel are overwhelmed.
- Recipients of EOD funding must sign on to IMAC (Iowa Mutual Aid Compact)

The Task Force was asked to consider remaining questions that were distributed by Jim Kenkel (and outlined on page 2 of these notes) for further discussion at the next meeting.

Next Steps and Future Meetings

SPPG will research governments/entities that have signed onto IMAC and will conduct a survey to determine the status of existing equipment, including existing equipment, age, condition, vehicles, and priorities for new equipment.

The next Task Force meeting will be January 11th 1:00 - 4:00 pm at the Fire Service Training Bureau in Ames.

EOD Task Force
January 11, 2005 ■ 1:00 – 4:00 pm
Fire Service Training Bureau

Task Force Members Present

Brent Cirksena, Waterloo PD
Mike Keefe, State Fire Marshals Office
Jim Kenkel, State Fire Marshal
Len Murray, Des Moines PD
Brian Weldon, Waterloo PD

SPPG

Jennifer Furler
Arlinda McKeen
Rachel Scott

Welcome and Introductions—Arlinda McKeen

McKeen welcomed the group and began the meeting. Due to weather and cancellations, the meeting was to be somewhat brief and spent on some informational issues and gathering input.

Review of Bomb Tech Survey

Summaries of the BT surveys were distributed. Task Force members were not surprised at the results, but the surveys highlighted the need for newer bomb suits. There was discussion about the need to keep EOD officers safe with basic current equipment updates. Waterloo PD will check on warranties for bomb suits. McKeen said that there are clear expectations from HLSEM that there be three or four regional EOD teams plus the State Fire Marshals Office.

The available funding would not be adequate to “keep current” the equipment for every team and still elevate the level of regional teams for WMD response. Difficult decisions need to be made based on how funding should be spent regarding what’s best for regional response versus individual teams getting funded. All teams are already at a minimum standard, according to FBI recertification. EOD-9 suit and/or helmet upgrades were discussed.

Discussion of Regional Team Concept—Facilitated Discussion

There was discussion of regional teams not necessarily meaning that equipment does not need to be replicated among teams that are close to each other. How do we draw boundaries around a regional team to make sure there is statewide coverage? Some said it is not practical to demarcate the state the way HLSEM wants the Task Force to do. If there was a WMD event, it’s likely that everyone would respond. The notion of regions seems nonsensical in some ways. Logically, a major incident would need a response that is not regional.

Is the real decision between supporting existing teams where they are and dividing up the state for the Fire Marshals Office? This seems to already be in place. The State Fire Marshals Office will respond whatever the case. Assuming HLSEM would sign off on that concept, how would the funding be divided? Some possibilities: getting newer suits, equipment for all teams, then get robots with what's left. There will be an issue with investing a lot of money in the Linn County/Cedar Rapids/Iowa City area to support so many teams. The issue of how to divide up funding is important because all teams need to be able to respond to major events. If every tech in the state is not being kept up to speed, that squanders already limited resources.

What is the difference between a bomb tech's day-to-day response and a bomb tech's response to a WMD event? Very little. EOD techs differ in that each tech needs highly specialized protection and training. Any incident could be potentially lethal. If all teams are funded, there must be consistency between them. Is it more practical to fund per team or per tech? SPPG will look at the rest of the BT surveys with some Task Force members and pinpoint the gaps in equipment that should be filled with the FY04 funding. It was suggested that funding be spent to get every team one EOD-9. It would still need to be determined where a limited number of robots would be placed. Des Moines and the SFO already have robots; one robot is needed in western Iowa, eastern Iowa, and Northern Iowa. Scott County has access to one through Illinois. Possible placement of robots could be in Denison, Waterloo, and the Iowa City/Cedar Rapids area. These decisions would need to be made by local stakeholders.

HLSEM has already been told that robots would be purchased with FY04 money, so buying robots has to be a priority. The group could decide on a suggestion for funding, but needs input from the eastern Iowa contingent?

3 robots	\$600,000
training	\$ 50,000
suits/SCBA	\$350,000

There may be some flexibility with equipment, but the robots especially need to be housed in a municipality that signs on the IMAC. It can't be forgotten that trailers for the robots cost \$7,000 each. Des Moines' total was \$187,000 for the robot and trailer. The discussion still needs to happen with HLSEM about the impracticality of regions. Year 1 of the proposed effort would include making sure everyone is consistently trained and equipped, and that three robots would be purchased in places, X, Y, and Z.

Some suggested it would be best to spend the funding on big-ticket items—the ones that chiefs and sheriffs can't easily buy themselves. There will be no more

FBI-purchased equipment, all of that would be made available through state homeland security. It would be difficult to get any funding from the regions. They are very particular about the definition of regional capacity.

Regionalizing provides a disincentive to teams who don't participate to keep their techs trained and puts an undue burden on the teams we would expect to respond across the state. Maintenance and upgrade costs are also considerable. It might be possible to buy an extended two-year warranty that could be covered with this funding. It should also be discussed with HLSEM that it may be unwise to buy this many robots now as no one really has experience with knowing how well they work, how far they may need to go, etc. Again, the EOD effort is much different because there are no volunteer bomb techs and very few trained techs across the state. Because the operation and maintenance of the robot is so specialized, it is difficult to have every tech trained to the top level. The robot really needs to have that specialized person with it on any call-out.

Summary of First Responder Advisory Committee Meeting on Dec. 21, 2004—Len Murray

Murray updated the group on the First Responders Advisory Committee Meeting. AFIS and LiveScan did not get funded. The EOD group was well-received because state employees were not doing the proposal. FRAC members were very turned off by state employees requesting additional funding from local pass through. IEMA has put together a list of issues and funding priorities. There has already been some discussion about funding from Administrator Miller and General Dardis. EOD got \$1,000,250—what was asked for. Other groups' funding was also discussed. Even the planning contract with SPPG has been paid for from other HLSEM funds.

McKeen added that IEMA members are in attendance at the NIMS Conference, and that SPPG would be covering the EOD and SWAT presentations at the IEMA panel following the NIMS Conference on 1/12/05. Handouts on each effort will be provided to the emergency management coordinators, who will be disseminating them.

Review of Issues with Consensus—Facilitated Discussion

Consensus issues will be reviewed with HLSEM and DPS and brought back to the Task Force. If the idea of statewide response is not accepted by these groups, the Task Force will have to resume the creation of regions.

Kenkel stated that DPS initially wanted all of the funding for the State, this Task Force has been created to distribute funding to locals to create WMD response capacity. All eight squads need to receive funding since the pool of techs is so limited. It would be a mistake to alienate some squads. In the proposed plan, all squads will receive something in the way of gear, training etc. regardless of

whether or not they house the robot. This will create universal response capability in Iowa.

A legal opinion of IMACs ability to cover liability issues will be needed to ensure that such coverage is available. Keefe suggested that a group representing the Task Force be sent to discuss this proposal with DPS. Kenkel suggested that this be proposed to HLSEM then brought to the DPS Commissioner. Murray added that these officials have asked locals to make recommendations, he hopes that the work of this Task Force will be honored as this proposal moves forward.

Areas of Additional Focus for the EOD Task Force—Facilitated Discussion

- Number and location of teams to cover the state
- Role of 28E agreements and MOUs
- Team size standards for response to major incident
- Response standards
- Possibility of consequences of not responding
- Which teams are willing to participate and respond
- Specific uses of funding
- Other

Next Steps and Future Meetings

McKeen will bring these initial recommendations to Dave Miller, HLSEM and Kevin Techau, DPS before the Task Force convenes.

The next Task Force meeting will be held February 8 at 1:00 p.m. at the Fire Service Training Bureau in Ames.

EOD Task Force
February 8, 2005 ■ 1:00 – 4:00 pm
Fire Service Training Bureau

Task Force Members

Gerry Bustos, Quad Cities
John Chipman, Marion PD
Brent Cirksena, Waterloo PD
Chad Driver, Pottawattamie County Sheriff's Office
Bob Hagist, Cedar Rapids PD
Don Huss, Davenport PD
Mike Keefe, State Fire Marshal Office
Jim Kenkel, State Fire Marshal Office
Len Murray, Des Moines PD
Marti Reilly, Sioux City PD
Russ Schafnitz, Des Moines PD
Dave Schipper, State Fire Marshal Office
Jim Strother, Cedar Rapids PD
Brian Weldon, Waterloo PD
Mike Zlatohlavek, Linn County Sheriff's Office

Staff

Jennifer Furler
Arlinda McKeen
Rachel Scott

Welcome

Rachel Scott welcomed all members and asked them to introduce themselves. An announcement was made that the Chiefs and Sheriffs meeting would be held on February 24, from 9 am to noon. She indicated it was critical for the ultimate decision maker to be present; Task Force members were also welcome to attend.

Jennifer Furler distributed current information on the bomb squad equipment survey. This information will be complete as soon as data is received from the last two departments. This will be helpful in making decisions on funding priorities.

Review and Discussion of Initial Task Force Proposal

The updated Task Force proposal was distributed and reviewed. Changes from the previous meeting were outlined. Essentially, there would be no artificial lines drawing regions of the state for response. Each existing EOD team would receive support from these WMD funds to maintain a certified EOD team/tech. Upon call-out for a major incident by the Governor, or another trigger, a tech from any part of the state, most likely the closest team, could be summoned.

Training funding was discussed. The question debated regarded whether a designated training budget item would be for basic training or for coordinated training. Some expressed the need for a fund to help new techs reach basic levels. Others suggested it be used only for regional and coordinated training.

It was also noted that this recommendation should include backfill costs while techs are in training. Also, this is aimed for regional training for Iowa techs to train together, not training provided in other states. This also will not involve Iowa officers responding in Illinois.

The consensus was that training funds be used for training and backfill for Iowa regional training to allow the techs to train together each year.

The discussion turned to non-robot- related equipment. It was suggested that the EOD-9 suits are needed. TPX film is no longer manufactured, so the digital X-ray component will be required sooner than anticipated, with a cost of \$22,000 for the processor without a computer. Electronics counter measures, which disable cell phones, and pagers have been used for many years by the FBI. Others reported that these are now no longer recommended because the frequency ranges are so vast that these may have too great an impact that could result in the blockage of too many frequencies.

Costs for equipment to help squads meet qualifications

X-ray processor	\$22,000
EOD – suit	\$18,500
SCBA	\$ 4,500
For 8 teams	\$360,000

Hammer suit	\$ 300
Shock absorber for pan disruptor if mounted on a robot (unknown)	

The discussion focused around how to ensure the best use of the funds for each team. Another low-cost piece of equipment are hammer suits, which take the place of a level B suit. Hammer suits are re-usable if not contaminated. Any funds not needed for the basic equipment will be allocated according to the need to keep all teams up to date. It was also suggested that if a team needs to replace equipment on the FBI minimum list, funds should go on a high priority to that equipment. Consensus was achieved on these recommendations, based on the equipment listed here.

Location and shared use of robots was discussed. The Quad Cities Bomb Squad stated the for a major incident the robot would be available for use anywhere in Iowa. (Omaha has two robots.) Omaha trains every other month with the Pottawattamie County and Council Bluffs Squad and seems willing to respond outside their jurisdiction, even outside of Pottawattamie County.

Placement of robots was discussed to ensure statewide access as needed. Robots already exist in Des Moines (2 in Des Moines and Fire Marshal), access in Omaha, and Quad Cities. Local jurisdictions need to make the decision on where the robots will be housed.

Cedar Rapids expressed interest in housing a robot. Linn County also has an interest. Concern was expressed about the costs of response. If the costs become a state responsibility it would help with that issue. It was suggested that some of the jurisdictions come together prior to the chiefs and sheriffs meeting to recommend a location for the equipment.

Jim Kenkel will check with the FBI to ensure this approach will meet their criteria for every squad to have a robot by 2009. The expectation is that this will be acceptable access to a robot.

Options that emerged from the discussion include:

- Denison, Waterloo PD, CR PD
- Denison, Waterloo PD and the I-80 corridor would decide who gets it
- All are placed in Fire Marshal offices

FBI re-certification was reported to not require testing on a robot. Options are being considered to offer additional training as an add-on to the school.

Response time is not an issue. Placing the robots according to these suggested sites will provide statewide response capacity and take into account the distribution of population and number of incidents.

The formalized agreement between local jurisdictions and the state will be critical to the entire process. McKeen noted the information regarding the IMAC function where individual jurisdictions are covering the costs of response. Dave Miller suggested a 28E agreement similar to the USAR agreement, but adapted to the EOD need, would be more appropriate than using IMAC. In this case, a 28E agreement would be constructed so the called-out resources would be considered state resources.

There was consensus in the recommendation to pursue a 28E agreement that would result in the participating jurisdictions signing an agreement with the state

that would consider the resources as state resources. Members will be provided a copy of the USAR 28E agreement that may serve as a model for EOD needs.

FY05 funding was discussed. Kenkel outlined the request for FY05 funding. The request included the suggested purchase of five mini-robots to be used in regions. The question remains what the FBI requirements will be regarding the 2009 requirements for a robot.

Resource distribution on the local level will be an issue with chiefs and sheriffs. Consideration should be given to ensure that some of the funds be provided for the needs of jurisdictions that may already be at the FBI minimum, and still need to acquire equipment to move to the next level.

Resources given for FY05 funds will be to maintain the minimum FBI standards. That should be the highest priority for future years.

Priorities for FY05 funding:

- Keeping each squad compliant with FBI minimum standards
- Regional training and backfill, similar to previous year
- Mini-robots, assuming FBI requires each squad to own its own, and a mini-robot qualifies.
- Vehicles (cost up to \$350,000 - \$400,000)
- Future technology enhancements

For the future years beyond 05, canines may be a consideration.

Consensus and Final Recommendations

The Task Force members expressed consensus on the items discussed in the proposal.

Decision makers may have some concerns that we can anticipate for our discussion:

- Terms of 28E agreement
- Issue of city attorney/county attorney review of a 28E agreement.
- Des Moines has invested a lot in HazMat, EOD, and SWAT already, there need to be funds available to raise them to the next level.
- Ongoing costs may be questions for decision makers.
- Responsibility for costs of out-of-jurisdiction response.

Next Steps and Future Meetings

The chiefs and sheriffs meeting will be on February 24 from 9:00 – noon. A location will be announced very soon. Letters and e-mails will be sent to the chiefs and sheriffs, with e-mails also being sent to each Task Force member.

**Planning for Statewide EOD Response Capacity
Chiefs & Sheriffs Decision Making Session
February 24, 2005 ■ 9:00 am – 12:00 pm
Fire Service Training Bureau ■ 3100 Haber Road ■ Ames**

Chiefs and Sheriffs

Barry Bedford, Chief of Coralville PD
Michael Bladel, Chief of Davenport PD
Jeff Danker, Pottawattamie Co. Sheriff
Harry Daugherty, Chief of Marion PD
Joseph Frisbie, Chief of Sioux City PD
Terry Glandon, representing Scott County Sheriff
Thomas Jennings, Chief of Waterloo PD
Jim Kenkel, State Fire Marshal
Mike Klappholz, Chief of Cedar Rapids PD
Mike Kubik, Blackhawk Co Sheriff
Troy Lawrence, representing Johnson Co Sheriff
William McCarthy, Chief of Des Moines PD
Donald Zeller, Linn Co Sheriff

Task Force and Guests

Brian Adolph
Chad Driver
Bob Hagist, Cedar Rapids PD
Don Huss, Davenport PD
Mike Keefe, State Fire Marshals Office
Karl Kolz, Linn Co SO
John Morton, Sioux City PD
Len Murray, DMPD
Russ Schafnitz, DMPD
Dave Schipper, State Fire Marshals Office
Jim Strothers
Melvin Williams, Sioux City PD
Mike Zlatohlavek, Linn Co SO

State Public Policy Group

Jennifer Furler
Arlinda McKeen
Rachel Scott

Opening and Introductions

McKeen welcomed the chiefs and sheriffs and thanked the Task Force for all their work.

Overview of the process and progress to date

McKeen reviewed the process by which the Task Force developed the proposal that will be decided upon today. The process started about a year ago with a few meetings, and then set aside for a bit before the current facilitated Task Force process began. This effort is about local response. What the chiefs and sheriffs are here to do is make decisions about how locals will respond to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) events.

We are talking about only special situations. There is a requirement that there be a response to any WMD event in Iowa. There are statutory requirements for the State Fire Marshals Office to respond to any incident that occurs outside the jurisdictions of existing bomb squads.

When we reach a decision today, this process will almost be done. SPPG will do some outreach and education to stakeholders who were not involved in this process: these will be chiefs, sheriffs, and emergency management coordinators. We'll also talk to local policy makers, mayors, boards of supervisors and city councils, where we will tell them about the process and especially explain the process of providing statewide local response for EOD at the WMD/terrorism level.

Presentation of the Task Force Proposal

The proposal was designed to be clear and provide the information to those with little or no context about this effort. There has been a concerted effort by everyone involved in the Task Force to show equity and efficiency in moving the process forward.

- **Funding requirements applying to this effort**

There are about \$2 million to be used for this process. As soon as you sign off on this, the FY04 funds can be spent. This is local money, which is why your sign-off is needed. McKeen pointed out and explained the non-negotiable elements of the process in the proposal necessitated by the receipt of federal funds, as well as some minimal constraints set by Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HLSEM).

Because the federal funding for homeland security in Iowa has been cut about 1/3 per year, there may be little or no money to put toward this effort in the future. Because duplication of efforts is strongly discouraged, the big-ticket items, such as robots, are shared effectively in this plan.

- **Elements of the Proposal**

McKeen discussed the practical approach to providing "universal" statewide EOD coverage from all existing trained bomb techs. HLSEM has given their permission for the Task Force to take this approach. Part of

this decision was to ensure that there were no disincentives for trained bomb tech/teams to participate. It is important that no artificial boundaries or ranges be set up for response. What remains in effect is that the State Fire Marshals Office (SFO) will be called to respond to any region without its own EOD team. If the SFO responds and is overwhelmed by a WMD event, it would call out the higher level response, which means any team whether it be from the SFO or a local jurisdiction, though probably the closest one, will respond. There is an attitude throughout these departments and sheriffs' offices that they would help anyone in need.

If something happens, a local team will respond to its own situation first, and then call the SFO if needed. If you do not have an EOD team, you will call the SFO first, and if needed, additional teams will be called. Every effort has been made to make this a common sense process without undue bureaucracy. Local Incident Commanders will have the authority to determine whether the incident is a WMD/terrorism incident and call in whomever they think they need. HLSEM's duty officer may help with this decision. For a major event, the Governor may take action.

FBI standards are the recognized standards in this proposal for training, team definitions, etc. It is suggested that at least once a year the teams get together for a multi-agency training, which is suggested to be funded from this budget.

It is important to maximize resources. The Task Force felt that the first priority was to ensure that every team meets the minimum standards on training and equipment. The local decision makers would be in charge of deciding what their equipment need is. Many teams currently meet those minimum standards, so it is recognized that those teams need access to funding to increase their capacity to respond to WMD events.

The robots will be the decision point today. By 2009, the FBI will require that every certified team have a robot. What we don't yet know is if "access" to a robot will count, or whether a mini-robot will fulfill the requirement.

We have surveyed the existing equipment in each team. There are currently robots in Des Moines PD and the SFO. There is access to the robots in Omaha and the Illinois side of the Quad Cities. There is a significant gap in robot access in the northern half of the state. McKeen drew a map of the state with existing robots and pointed to suggested locations for three new robots.

The robots are sufficiently high maintenance to require a significant commitment of staff time for training and maintenance. There will be some redundancies also, as a highly trained staff person must accompany the robot on call outs and training exercises, even if it goes out with another certified team.

McKeen called attention to the suggested budget items and discussed each one. She clarified the spending priorities of the Task Force, and differentiated the FY04 priorities from the FY05 priorities: compliance with minimum standards and strategic planning for the purchase of big-ticket items.

Heart and soul to the decisions made today is the 28E agreement we will discuss. On the advice of Administrator Miller of HLSEM, the Task Force agreed that a 28E agreement be developed wherein participating agencies become "state resources" upon call out for a WMD/terrorism incident. The state becomes responsible for the cost of any WMD/terrorist response. Your teams will have to forge a uniform agreement with the state. This agreement would not need to be the same as the current Urban Search and Rescue (USAR); that is only a template. The attorneys battled in the creation of the USAR agreement. Admin. Miller needs to make sure that no one takes advantage of the state by calling a WMD response when there is no WMD incident.

Who is the "guardian" to make sure a WMD response is appropriate? By only giving the incident commander the right to call a statewide response, there is too much leeway. For example, you can't have a statewide response for every pipe bomb. The determination would be made by the certified bomb tech on site, according to Task Force members. The decisions would not be made by the fire chief, etc. The bomb tech goes through the incident commander. It was suggested that the SFO be the ones to make the determination although it was also suggested that a major metropolitan area like Des Moines or Cedar Rapids should be able to make a determination.

Would it be acceptable to define the SFO or certified bomb tech on scene as the trigger for a call-out of the statewide response? The fire departments would argue with "two" incident commands. There was some disagreement that it would have to be a technical, biological, or radiological event to trigger response. Each team should go through its local emergency management coordinator. The difficulty is adding a level of bureaucracy, but it will have to go through the HLSEM duty officer anyway. Some EMCs are not available all the time, which may present a

problem. Administrator Miller has emphasized that this be a matter of response, not a matter of bureaucracy.

Review and Discussion Proposal Elements

Non-negotiable Elements—no disagreement

Regional Structure and Response—no disagreement

Standards and Training—

- Eight hours a month training is mandatory; the FBI recommends 16 hours a month. Some of this training could be met by joint training and exercises to create a comfort level among teams participating in Statewide EOD response capacity. Meth lab training and EOD training need not be mutually exclusive.
- This agreement does not supersede FBI requirements for EOD techs; it is expected that all teams will continue to meet FBI requirements.
- The teams could coordinate such training among their bomb squad commanders. The group agreed that squads or their designee will coordinate the training—this will be added to the proposal.
- A board could be developed to refine these details, including the 28E and trigger mechanisms.

Equipment and Placement—

- All squads that are issued a number by the FBI, according to current language, are required to have a robot by 2009.
- The Fire Marshals Office is working to determine if *access to a robot* is sufficient to meet the FBI requirement that all squads have a robot by 2009. They are also trying to determine if mini robots meet this requirement. Not knowing this information makes it difficult to decide where the robots should be located.
- The second year of funding allows for the purchase of mini robots, which would hopefully put a robot with every existing EOD squad that does not have one by that point. Eventually all squads are likely to get a robot of some kind with these funds.
- Placement of robots with the Fire Marshal techs would preclude the other squads from getting a robot, which would put all local squads in jeopardy of not meeting FBI requirements. Placing robots with SFO would mean that there would not be enough funds to place a robot or mini robot with each squad in the state. It appears that placing the robots with the Fire Marshal Office is not the best use of resources.

Placement of Robots

McKeen continued the discussion of FBI compliance with robots. "For discussion purposes, let's assume that the mini-robots would meet the requirement. As chiefs and sheriffs, can we assume that you have the same priorities to keep minimum standards for every tech?"

It was suggested that the group agree to place one robot in Denison to protect northwest Iowa. We will take Davenport off the table because it already has access to a robot in Illinois.

There was a consensus among the group that Waterloo does get called into the northeastern part of the state. It was suggested to put the Des Moines-based SFO robot in the Denison office. However, the SFO said that their robot in Des Moines must be available for all non-EOD area call outs; placing their one existing robot in Denison would leave southern Iowa without any coverage. It was agreed that Waterloo PD would get the second robot.

Cedar Rapids PD has seven bomb techs. Surrounding areas have an average of two. It was suggested to place the robot where they have the most techs. Chances are any event would take place in the high population areas (eastern Iowa). Where does it make sense, considering the resources?

With maintenance, etc. having a robot adds considerable cost. Chief McCarthy recommended Cedar Rapids. Johnson County has a vehicle and trailer for a robot already. Without a trailer or any extras, the cost is between \$167,000 and \$196,000. Another model was priced at \$136,000 to Johnson County. Chief Bladel agreed that Cedar Rapids would be a good idea because of its ability to support sustainability.

As soon as the 28E agreements are signed, the funds will be available almost immediately. It was agreed upon to place the third robot in Cedar Rapids PD. All other teams will get mini-robots with the FY05 funds. A concern would be that chiefs and sheriffs would hesitate to use the robot in a situation where they are afraid the robot would be in jeopardy and a hosting municipality couldn't afford to pay for the maintenance. Chief McCarthy volunteered Len Murray and his team to help coordinate the training coordination structure and the 28E agreement negotiations.

With all exceptions noted and incorporated into a 28E with Len Murray's leadership in its development, would anyone like to add additional comments?

- The group agreed to the proposal.
- Kenkel reminded the group that because of the expense of having robots, that in the third year of money (if available) they might want to put money into a pot for maintenance.

- SPPG's role in this effort will end by June 30th. The Task Force will reconvene in late April or early May after the outreach effort. We'd like to invite you to come to those outreach sessions and give your input.
- The money can be spent the same day there are signatures on the 28E. You don't have to wait for the public outreach to be done. Work needs to get started on the 28E immediately.
- If a participating entity decides it doesn't want to sign, we should move on to the next interested city. We should order only three robots since they take 9 months to receive, and figure out all of this later, according to Williams.
- If the money is not spent by September, it will be gone. We need at least one city to sign the 28E to set the wheels in motion.
- Murray asked if it would be acceptable to send out drafts of the 28E to chiefs and sheriffs via email. The group agreed.

The revised proposal was accepted. McKeen thanked the group for their time and effort.

Process to Develop Plan for Local WMD EOD Response Capacity

The process to develop the plan for local EOD response capacity for WMD/Terrorism events was designed and implemented by State Public Policy Group. Use of a non-government, outside facilitator was important to ensure that state level interests did not influence the decisions on developing equitable access across the state to WMD-level response for EOD incidents. Since the decisions necessary to proceed were required to come from local leaders, the state chose to participate in the process in its statutory role of local responder through the State Fire Marshals Office.

Active involvement of local stakeholders was essential to the success of this process. At all times, State Public Policy Group engaged those who would be impacted by the resulting plan. The process included initial review of early work and conversations with key players, participation in the EOD Task Force, the respective police chiefs and sheriffs, local law enforcement and emergency management statewide, and local policymakers statewide.

Scan of EOD Capacity and Status

To begin the process of developing local capacity for EOD response to WMD/Terrorism events, SPPG undertook a review of previous work, data, and elicited information through a series of conversations with key individuals involved in Iowa EOD efforts.

Among the data and reports reviewed were the following:

- Iowa Bomb Cases for Calendar Year 2002 by County
- Iowa Bomb Cases for Calendar Year 2003 by County
- Briefing document provided by the State Fire Marshal summarizing existing capacity and accredited squads.
- Summary document, *Explosive Ordnance Disposal – EOD*, which included results, conclusions, and recommendations or a survey to identify the capability and limitations of EOD operations in Iowa.
- Review of FBI Bomb Data Center Information Bulletins

An early scan was conducted by the SPPG staff to talk with key players in Iowa about EOD response capacity, the earlier work, and the expectations for the current Task Force initiative. Staff contacted individuals representing EOD teams across the state as well as law enforcement association leadership to visit informally about their views on the current capacity, known issues, insights to assist with this work, and general background information regarding statewide EOD response capacity.

The following individuals were interviewed:

- Brian Adolph, Johnson County Sheriff Department

- Lee Bennett, Council Bluffs Police Department
- Mike Bladel, Davenport Police Department
- John Chipman, Marion Police Department
- Bob Hagist, Cedar Rapids Police Department
- Don Huss, Davenport Police Department
- Jim Kenkel, State Fire Marshal
- Mike Klappholz, Cedar Rapids Police Department
- Bill McCarthy, Des Moines Police Department
- Dave Miller, Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management
- Len Murray, Des Moines Police Department
- Brian Weldon, Waterloo Police Department
- Mel Williams, Sioux City Police Department
- Mike Zlatohlavek, Linn County Sheriff Department

Task Force

The Statewide EOD Response Capacity Task Force built upon an existing structure of current bomb squad commanders that had taken up the issue. The structure was amended to ensure representation from across the state. The State Fire Marshals Office and one sheriff from a county without a bomb squad (Appanoose) were added. Three meetings were conducted and facilitated by SPPG, with early agreement. The first meeting held December 15, 2004, provided an opportunity to review the current status EOD Response Capacity for WMD/Terrorist events and begin drafting solutions. The second meeting held January 11, 2005, consisted of drafting the proposal. Points of contentious discussion included the placement of robots around the state. A proposal was agreed upon at the third meeting, held February 8, 2005. Throughout this process, the members of the Task Force kept the police chiefs and sheriffs from their local jurisdictions apprised to the Task Force's progress.

Police Chiefs and Sheriffs

The police chiefs and sheriffs representing the jurisdictions of the Task Force members met once at a meeting facilitated by SPPG on February 24, 2005. They quickly reached a consensus regarding the Statewide EOD Response Capacity Task Force.

Stakeholders and Policymakers

SPPG chose six locations around Iowa to conduct stakeholder and policymaker outreach meetings: Marshalltown, Cherokee, Dubuque, Mason City, Atlantic and Fairfield. These locations were chosen to represent all parts of Iowa, and represent cities that do not currently house EOD teams. Invitations were sent out in advance of each meeting, to all local government entities and pertinent associations, as well as the Iowa State Association of Counties (ISAC) and Iowa League of Cities.

Separate meetings were held for stakeholders and policymakers. Stakeholders had expressed interest in the areas of operations and protocol with the EOD response capacity. Policymakers expressed interest in the financial and liability components. This provided an opportunity to receive feedback from the two different groups that could accurately represent their respective concerns.

A slide presentation was given at each meeting that described the plan that the Task Force and the chiefs and sheriff's group had agreed upon. After the presentation, SPPG facilitated a guided, scripted discussion regarding the plan and its impact on participants and their jurisdictions. This discussion format was used consistently throughout the outreach process. Attendees were aware that their comments were being captured in notes, but would be non-attributable.

Attendance at the stakeholder meetings was acceptable, with every meeting attended. However, policymakers were not present at the Marshalltown, Dubuque, or Fairfield meetings. Attendance in Mason City, Cherokee and Atlantic was limited. However, SPPG is well aware that local policymakers often rely on their emergency management coordinators to keep them informed on this type of information, and many emergency management coordinators attended the stakeholders meetings.

Feedback from the outreach meetings was provided to the State Fire Marshal and Commissioner of Public Safety in this report.

Outreach Summary

State Public Policy Group continued the planning process by taking the information from the Task Force to interested parties at the local level. SPPG provided an overview of the local EOD response capacity for WMD/Terrorist incidents through a presentation and facilitated discussion. The purpose was twofold: to explain how Iowa will develop this new capacity and gain access to it, and to hear local thoughts on the proposed statewide EOD response capacity for WMD/terrorist level threats. This effort focused on two main groups:

- **Stakeholders** – Police chiefs, sheriffs, fire marshals officials, emergency management coordinators, and other responders were invited to participate with a focus on how this new capacity will provide a new level of response for every jurisdiction in the state. Information focused on the protocols and structure of the designated local teams for WMD-level EOD response.
- **Policymakers** – Local elected officials were also invited to attend a separate meeting in each location to specifically focus on the policy and funding issues that would be of most concern to them. County supervisors, mayors, city council members, and other local policymakers were encouraged to attend. State legislators received invitations so they would be aware of this effort.

A slide presentation and discussion questions were designed for both groups. At each meeting, SPPG staff presented information regarding the statewide WMD/terrorist response capacity, and solicited input through scripted questions. Attendees were made aware that all responses to the discussion questions were non-attributable. Six stakeholder sessions and six policymaker sessions were offered in March and April in Marshalltown, Cherokee, Dubuque, Mason City, Atlantic and Fairfield. These locations were chosen to reflect Iowa's unique rural and urban balance and to give all interested participants an opportunity to attend a meeting in their area. Special attention was paid to have meetings in areas with no participating EOD teams. Stakeholders were in attendance at all meetings, and policymakers were in attendance at the Cherokee, Atlantic and Mason City meetings.

Total attendance at the six meetings also sends a message. In general, there was average attendance across the board. Participation in the stakeholder meetings was higher, as expected, than participation in policymaker sessions. Law enforcement's interest is primarily to find out what needs to be done and how, which motivates their attendance at a higher level. Still, a relatively small total attendance reflects a degree of comfort with the system; if there were strong concerns, turnout would have been large statewide. Attendance at the six stakeholder meetings totaled 54; attendance at the six policymaker meetings totaled 11.

Themes from Public Input

Across the meetings, several themes emerged. Generally, taken as a group, stakeholders' and policymakers' opinions were not much different, especially in seeing a need for the WMD/terrorist event EOD capacity, and thoughts about coverage and response time. Their opinions differed when discussing financial issues.

The following comments taken from the sessions and discussion summaries are representative of the feedback.

"It is just as likely to happen here as in any other part of the state."

The vast majority of the attendees at both the stakeholder and policymaker meetings felt that their jurisdiction might need to call out a WMD-level EOD response team at some point, though they felt the likelihood was quite small. Most agreed that they would have fewer than three incidents per year in which they would need to callout a response team, and those might not all require WMD/Terrorism level response. However, they also stressed the importance of having that capacity available when they did need it. Stakeholders and policymakers felt that school threats, proximity to the Mississippi and Missouri rivers, large industrial sites, and colleges were the greatest risks and were the most likely reasons for a WMD/terrorist level callout.

"Holding the perimeter is one thing; trained response to an incident is another."

Almost every response regarding who should be in charge of a WMD/terrorist level incident included the need for a unified command structure. This was consistent with the new protocol, which emphasizes that command remains at the local level, even when the teams from outside the jurisdiction are called in. Policymakers were generally more comfortable handing over the command entirely to the EOD squads that would be called in. Participants expressed understanding and respect for certified bomb technicians' knowledge about the situation, but also felt that local jurisdictions play an important role in managing the incident. Local stakeholders reinforced the importance that local law enforcement's knowledge of their home area be respected.

"If you have a dirty bomb ready to go off, one minute is too long. If it's already gone off, it's a cleanup."

Regarding the question of response time, both stakeholders and policymakers agreed that the target response time of being on site in three to four hours made the best of a difficult situation. Most attendees commented on the fact that any time spent waiting on support for a WMD/terrorist level event is less than ideal. However, they expressed understanding, and praised the Task Force for developing a plan for this response capacity. Most stakeholders and

policymakers expressed concern over waiting longer than three hours for a bomb squad to arrive in their jurisdiction, and accepted that most areas would have to contain the situation for at least one hour. Stakeholders cited that the western Iowa region was underrepresented in coverage, and may be subject to a higher risk than other parts of the state. Some of that concern reflects general understanding that the Fire Marshals Office is understaffed and it would be difficult to deploy bomb teams in a short time frame.

“Our funding is already strained; please don’t put anything else on us.”

Policymakers concentrated many of their thoughts on costs to their jurisdictions while hosting EOD squads that could travel to their areas. Aside from the actual costs for food and lodging, they stressed concerns regarding liability issues for the visiting EOD squad. Policymakers felt that there might be a tendency to make WMD-level callouts more readily, knowing that the costs would then be transferred to the state. They suggested the establishment of guidelines and additional awareness training for law enforcement to address that concern and alleviate the risk of costs being deferred to the local jurisdiction unexpectedly.

Stakeholders also had funding concerns, but concentrated most of their comments on making sure that they determined the threat appropriately, calling in the EOD team, therefore attenuating their financial responsibility. Stakeholders indicated that the expenses faced by the home jurisdiction were acceptable if the incident needed the attention of the EOD squad. Stakeholders did not feel that they would purposefully make unnecessary callouts to shift costs of non-WMD/terrorist events to the state. In fact, many stakeholders cautioned that the opposite may take place: worried about calling up expensive resources for a false alarm, local law enforcement might not call for an EOD squad when they should. Stakeholders suggested additional training at the awareness level would help alleviate both concerns.

“You have started the process and given us the resources to call upon.”

Stakeholders had two main concerns with the callout protocol: false alarms and funding. Many stakeholders expressed concerns about being charged by the state if their jurisdiction made a callout that did not turn out to be an actual WMD/terrorist threat. They felt that a lot of pressure was being placed on the local law enforcement personnel to make decisions that they were not qualified to make. The most suggested solution was to provide a standard level of awareness training to local law enforcement personnel to better qualify them as first responders to a scene to make better judgments as to the need for a WMD/terrorist level EOD response.

Stakeholders expressed that they are very pleased with the proposed callout protocol because it provides them with guidelines, indicating that it is a positive first step for local jurisdictions to know where to start calling, and how the EOD

callout process can take place. They also mentioned how pleased they were with the new coverage for formerly underserved areas, and how it will assist local jurisdictions in planning and training. They also indicated that they would most likely call the State Fire Marshals office first in the event of a callout.

“This is a statewide effort that needs to be funded statewide.”

Policymakers concentrated their comments regarding maintaining this local capacity beyond the grant period on sustainability issues. They expressed concerns about the ability and the appropriateness for all local jurisdictions to fund the WMD/terrorist level EOD response after the federal funding is no longer available. Many policymakers felt that their local jurisdiction should not be financially responsible for an effort that has statewide implications. They also spoke at length about other initiatives that have ended in unfunded mandates from the state, and how their local jurisdictions suffered.

Stakeholders agreed with policymakers on the issue of financial sustainability. They cautioned that a lack of state support could create a situation where local jurisdictions, in an attempt to cut costs, do not provide the appropriate level of service, putting pressure on public health and safety. Stakeholders also suggested finding sustainability funds from the federal government.

“Education is key, just keep trying to reach new people.”

Stakeholders expressed the importance for this plan to be a baseline that all local jurisdictions have an awareness of, and can use effectively. They suggested holding additional training sessions around the state to educate all individuals involved with WMD/terrorist level EOD response. They also suggested the need for an awareness level training requirement for law enforcement personnel in each local jurisdiction, including first responders, emergency management coordinators and dispatchers.

Policymakers Script

Introductions

Please introduce yourself and tell us your position and jurisdiction.

1. Does your jurisdiction have a bomb squad, and has your jurisdiction signed the IMAC?
2. In your opinion, how likely is it your jurisdiction might need to call out a WMD-level EOD response team as we've described today? What is the most likely type of event to trigger such a callout?
3. In the event of a WMD-level callout, who you think should be in charge of the incident?

Adequate Coverage

The proposed plan would provide local WMD-level response capacity for EOD incidents statewide by leveraging Iowa's existing FBI-certified bomb techs. For the purposes of a WMD-level callout, the team(s) would be considered a State resource, and the State would be responsible for the costs, liability, etc. of the event.

1. Based on the EOD resources you've heard described today, would there adequate capacity from either local or State Fire Marshals Office bomb techs to respond if you had a WMD-level EOD incident in your jurisdiction?
2. This agreement necessitates that bomb squads would have to travel out of their home jurisdictions, if called to respond to an EOD incident. What concerns might you, as local policymakers, have as a hosting jurisdiction?

28E Agreements

In a proposed 28E agreement currently under consideration by participating entities, the State of Iowa agrees indefinitely to pick up the costs of a WMD-level EOD response. Local jurisdictions remain, as they are now, responsible for the costs of routine, non-WMD bomb squad response. Participating jurisdictions that have bomb squads will agree to maintain WMD-level response for a certain amount of time, even after state and federal funding for this initiative run out.

1. Would you foresee a problem with local jurisdictions making unnecessary callouts of the WMD-level EOD teams in attempts to shift costs of routine EOD events to the State?

2. Since it is a given that each jurisdiction will have WMD-level coverage for EOD incidents under this proposal, what, if any, degree of responsibility should your home jurisdiction have in continued funding of this effort? Is it fair to participating jurisdictions to have to bear the full costs of maintaining training as well as highly sensitive equipment?
3. Can you think of issues pertaining to response to your jurisdiction that the EOD Task Force may not have fully considered?

General Questions and Discussion

1. Do you have any additional concerns or questions you would like to bring to our attention that will be conveyed to the Task Force?

Law Enforcement and EMCs Script

Introductions

Please introduce yourself and tell us your position and jurisdiction.

1. Does your jurisdiction have a bomb squad, and has your jurisdiction signed the IMAC?
2. In your opinion, how likely is it your jurisdiction might need to call out a WMD-level EOD response team as we've described today? What is the most likely type of event to trigger such a callout?
3. In the event of a WMD-level callout, who you think should be in charge of the incident?

Adequate Coverage

The proposed plan would provide local WMD-level response capacity for EOD incidents statewide by leveraging Iowa's existing FBI-certified bomb techs. For the purposes of a WMD-level callout, the team(s) would be considered a State resource, and the State would be responsible for the costs, liability, etc. of the event.

1. Based on the EOD resources you've heard described today, would there adequate capacity from either local or State Fire Marshals Office bomb techs to respond if you had a WMD-level EOD incident in your jurisdiction?
2. What is an acceptable response time for an EOD squad, including an EOD robot and robot-trained technician, to be on the scene once they've been called for a WMD-level event? Why?
3. This agreement necessitates that bomb squads would have to travel out of their home jurisdictions, if called to respond to an EOD incident. What problems might arise for the hosting jurisdiction during such a call-out?
4. With WMD-level callout expenses treated as State resources, would you foresee a problem with local jurisdictions making unnecessary callouts of the WMD-level EOD teams in attempts to shift costs of routine EOD events to the State?

Callout Protocol

To prevent unnecessary callouts and ensure that EOD techs are available to serve their home jurisdictions as much as possible, local jurisdictions must agree to follow a somewhat strict protocol for the call out of WMD-level EOD response.

1. What, if any, are the limitations you see for your ability to comply with the callout protocol? Who in your jurisdiction would it make the most sense to determine the need for a WMD-level EOD callout?
2. What are the strengths of the proposed callout protocol?
3. If your jurisdiction does not have an EOD team, who would you be more likely to call in case you needed help with a routine EOD incident? The local team nearest you, or the State Fire Marshals Office tech nearest you?
4. For the start-up years of this statewide local response capacity effort the entire cost will be borne through federal funds. Since it is a given that each jurisdiction will have WMD-level coverage for EOD incidents under this proposal, what, if any, degree of responsibility do you think your home jurisdiction should have in continued funding of this effort?
5. How should this new capacity be rolled out and implemented so all jurisdictions are up to speed on it?
6. Can you think of issues pertaining to your jurisdiction regarding response that the EOD Task Force may not have fully considered?

Outreach Notes

Policymakers

**EOD Policymaker Session
March 23, 2005 7:30-9:00 am
Cherokee Community Center, Cherokee, IA**

Attendees

Gary Brown, Woodbury County Emergency Management
Robert Christensen, Buena Vista County Emergency Management
Terry Graybill, Cherokee County Supervisor
Bill Lanphere, Buena Vista County Supervisor
Dean Schmidt, Cherokee County Supervisor

State Public Policy Group

Ben Banowetz
Arlinda McKeen

1. Does your jurisdiction have a bomb squad, and has your jurisdiction signed the IMAC?
 - The state of Iowa will pay the costs, its similar to IMAC
 - Do County's have to sign 28E's? No, locals and the bomb teams will sign them.
 - IMAC will create a support for larger jurisdictions and smaller jurisdictions will lean on us, the cost of maintenance is not covered in IMAC.
 - Dave Miller requested that this not be covered under IMAC. This is patterned after the USAR capacity statewide. Any call-outs for WMD incidents will be paid by the state. If you have a call-out for another need, it would likely fall under IMAC or another compact. If an officer is injured during a WMD incident, he/she will be treated as if they were in their home district. The legal liability is the responsibility of the State for the WMD incident. Non-WMD/Terrorism call-outs will be the responsibility of the requesting jurisdictions.

2. In your opinion, how likely is it that your jurisdiction might need to call-out a WMD-level EOD response team as we've described today? What is the most likely type of event to trigger such a call-out?
 - We would need to know the definition of a WMD/Terrorist event to answer this question.

3. In the event of a WMD-level call-out, who do you think should be in charge of the incident?

- Which teams have the Robots, and are they FBI certified bomb teams? Yes, it takes two techs to compose a “team” and they meet the FBI certifications.

Adequate Coverage

1. Based on the EOD resources you’ve heard described today, would there be an adequate capacity, from either local or State Fire Marshal’s Office, of bomb techs to respond if you had a WMD-level EOD incident in your jurisdiction?

McKeen noted that there would be different people working on this project as opposed to the Bioterrorism project.

2. What is an acceptable response time for an EOD squad, including an EOD robot and robot-trained technician, to be on the scene once they’ve been called for a WMD-level event? Why?
 - How do they determine if it’s a WMD level call-out?
Response: The Certified Bomb tech that goes out determines the need for a call-out.
 - Is the definition of WMD incident in this handout?
Response: We’re not able to tell here, but it will be included in the 28E document
3. This agreement necessitates that bomb squads would have to travel out of their home jurisdictions, if called to respond to an EOD incident. What problems might arise for the hosting jurisdiction during such a call-out?
 -
4. With WMD-level call-out expenses being treated as State resources, do you foresee a problem with local jurisdictions making unnecessary call-outs of the WMD-level EOD teams in attempts to shift costs of routine EOD events to the State?
 - On the anniversary of 9/11 we had a trucker that came into a weigh station and stated, “I have a bomb”. What did we do? We had to close down the interstate and take care of it. We had to act then.
 - Who pays for this? When there is a call-out and there is no WMD/Terrorism response, it cost 20-25K to shut down the interstate down.
Response: That is why we have protocol.
 - Is the state legislature going to ante up and pay for sustainability of this project? There have been a lot of meetings, but no definite answer.

- Do the teams have the requirement of continuing this regional response once funding runs out?
Response: The 28E is not signed yet, but it is probably expected to last the life of the equipment.
- Have local jurisdictions been asked to be billed once funding runs out?
Response: Not yet.
- Once sustainability runs out, we won't have access to the capacity. There is no local EOD money going toward staff or routine maintenance. If someone calls for help, people will always respond.
- I think the state is very short sighted to develop this capability and not develop the sustainability. The decision was made by locals to keep this money set aside. The Task Force members were composed of locals. This is a local deal, the state is keeping out of this. Is this a good use of 2 million dollars? The Task Force said yes. The Task Force wanted this statewide capacity.

Call-out Protocol

To prevent unnecessary call-outs, and ensure that EOD techs are available to serve their home jurisdictions as much as possible, local jurisdictions must agree to follow a somewhat strict protocol for the call-out of WMD-level EOD response.

1. What, if any, are the limitations you foresee regarding your ability to comply with the call-out protocol? In your jurisdiction, who would it make the most sense for to determine the need for a WMD-level EOD call-out?
 - We have leadership that can change as easily as elected officials. It's tough to commit long term. There is compromise on what was agreed to.
 - My issue is the lack of planning once it is built, once the money is gone this will become a waste of money.
 - Do teams have to come if called?
Response: Yes
 - Does it take a Governor's proclamation?
Response: Not necessarily. Call-out could be made by a tech on the scene. The HLSEM duty officer, administrator, or a certified bomb tech on-scene could make a call-out.
2. What are the strengths of the proposed call-out protocol?
3. If your jurisdiction does not have an EOD team, who would you be more likely to call in case you needed help with a routine EOD incident? The local team nearest you, or the State Fire Marshals Office tech nearest you?

- There is significant local opposition to this, Dave Miller at the last local meeting stated, "This is my decision, and I have made it."
4. During the start-up years of this statewide local response capacity effort the entire cost will be borne through federal funds. Since it is a given that each jurisdiction will have WMD-level coverage for EOD incidents under this proposal, what, if any, degree of responsibility do you think your home jurisdiction should have in the continuation of funding for this effort?
 - How do they determine if it's a WMD level call-out?
Response: The Certified Bomb tech that goes out determines the need for a call-out.
 - Is the definition of a WMD incident in this handout?
Response: Not able to tell here, it will be included in the 28E document. There is also the need to keep the definition somewhat vague to allow for flexibility.
 - We can't support this in Cherokee County. When the money goes away we won't be able to maintain it.
 5. How should this new capacity be rolled out and implemented so that all of the jurisdictions are up to speed?
 - Do County's have to sign 28E's?
Response: No, locals and bomb teams will sign them.
 6. Can you think of issues pertaining to your jurisdiction regarding response that the EOD Task Force may not have fully considered?
 - Ask Sioux Falls if their robot can come across state lines?
 - The money for this effort that SPPG is conducting is from the State, not the local cut
 - Is the State Fire Marshall getting any of the local money?
Response: No, they have their own funding.

EOD Policymaker Session
April 7, 2005 7:30-9:30 am
Atlantic Fire Department, Atlantic, IA

Attendees

Chuck Kinan, Atlantic, Cass County Supervisor
Bob Seivert, Shelby County Emergency Management Coordinator
Myron Manley, Osceola, Clarke County Supervisor

State Public Policy Group

Rachel Scott
Sarah Dixon

1. Does your jurisdiction have a bomb squad, and has your jurisdiction signed the IMAC?
 - We've had experience with bomb threats and have contacted the Fire Marshal's Office.
 - We've had bomb threats on schools, but no experience with actual events.
 - No, the jurisdiction does not have a bomb squad.
 - Cass County and Shelby County have signed the IMAC, the other county had not.

2. In your opinion, how likely is it that your jurisdiction might need to call-out a WMD-level EOD response team as we've described today? What is the most likely type of event to trigger such a call-out?
 - Cass County has had several threats at their schools, but nothing that would be WMD-related.
 - We'd have a need for the EOD unit, but not necessarily for a WMD threat.
 - We would call the State Fire Marshal's Office.

3. In the event of a WMD-level call-out, who do you think should be in charge of the incident?
 - We'd follow the national incident command structure and the chief law enforcement agency would be leading any response. My job is to facilitate and coordinate. Our Sheriff would be in charge, but he wouldn't want to be. We can't have an outside agency come in and take charge because they are lacking knowledge about the area.
 - None of the Sheriffs in Iowa would want this responsibility, but they would need to have it. Sheriff's Departments have been knocked down for years and they know this. If there were a fire, they wouldn't be in charge. It is an issue to decide the "whom."
 - The EMC works with the local jurisdiction to decide the "who" and we are trying to change the language so everyone understands unified command, etc. Our Sheriff and other law enforcement have been good about this.

- I think we'd be in good shape too.

Adequate Coverage

The proposed plan would provide local WMD-level response capacity for EOD incidents statewide by leveraging Iowa's existing FBI-certified bomb techs. For the purposes of a WMD-level call-out, the team(s) would be considered a State resource, and the State would be responsible for the costs, liability, etc. of the event.

1. Based on the EOD resources you've heard described today, would there be an adequate capacity, from either local or State Fire Marshal's Office, of bomb techs to respond if you had a WMD-level EOD incident in your jurisdiction?

- Yes.
- No – Shelby County – the map is unbalanced, and why aren't we using the same regions for emergency management, and using the State Fire Marshal's Office? The CDC/HRSA, ISAC, and EM regions are all the same, and for planning purposes we need to focus in on these regions. It is okay that the resources are coming from Denison, but the planning needs to involve those same people, otherwise there will be some inconsistencies. There need to be planning regions regardless of where the response comes from.
- Yes.

2. What is an acceptable response time for an EOD squad, including an EOD robot and robot-trained technician, to be on the scene once they've been called for a WMD-level event? Why?

- The only worry I'd have is about injury and the responsibility of the county.
- Liability is the issue for me too.
- With the IMAC agreement, if we have a response that is needed from outside of the area we are covered for people who get hurt, but not the equipment.

28E Agreements

In a proposed 28E agreement currently under consideration by participating entities, the State of Iowa agrees indefinitely to pick up the costs of a WMD-level EOD response. Local jurisdictions remain, as they are now, responsible for the costs of routine, and non-WMD bomb squad response. Participating jurisdictions that have bomb squads will agree to maintain WMD-level response for a certain amount of time, even after state and federal funding for this initiative have run out.

1. Would you foresee a problem with local jurisdictions making unnecessary call-outs of the WMD-level EOD teams in attempts to shift costs of routine EOD events to the State?

- Absolutely. If you have an unidentified device threatening a large business or school, why would you not think a WMD incident? Would it be intentional? No, but people will follow these protocols.
- I don't know that I'm qualified to answer that as a Supervisor.
- Same for me.
- It's not like anyone knows about any incident and we have to make the assumption that it is WMD. It would be unethical to assume it was not, as it would be unethical to assume it was. The question is strange because it makes it sound like people would intentionally misrepresent an incident. I think it is more complicated than the cost.

2. Since it is a given that each jurisdiction will have WMD-level coverage for EOD incidents under this proposal, what, if any, degree of responsibility should your home jurisdiction have in continued funding of this effort? Is it fair to participating jurisdictions to have to bear the full costs of maintaining training as well as highly sensitive equipment?

- As a Supervisor, our budget is tight. I would need to know how much money we're talking about. There is some responsibility, but I don't know how much.
- We are a small, rural county in southern Iowa. Any costs would need to be proportional.
- The funding would need to be for risk management and safety. We most likely will not have a WMD event in a rural county. I don't think I should have to support these teams on an ongoing basis, but I do think we need to have an ongoing agreement with these local teams. If they do come out, we support them for doing so. The state needs to support these teams. I feel the same way for HAZMAT and SWAT teams. What I'm seeing is money coming off the top to plan for these situations and that is what I'm concerned about.
- The state has a responsibility to help because most counties don't have money for this, and we also don't have the threat.
- If you are able to identify the perpetrator, you have a cost with that as well.

3. Can you think of issues pertaining to your jurisdiction regarding response that the EOD Task Force may not have fully considered?

- Most of the issues were covered, but I'm concerned about them keeping the locals informed so that when we develop a plan, all of the participants and players know what it is. Law enforcement is a closed community, but we have to be able to respond to the public needs and emergency management has to be able to speak intelligently about any given

situation so that we can make good decisions. It has an effect on the community and the budget. Who needs to be involved? Does a declaration need to be made? Etc.

- I'm disappointed that more people didn't come.
- I am too, and I have had to drive in both directions. Our meetings have to be split between the Supervisors because there are so many, and I was expecting to see more counties represented.
- You could feed people.
- A reminder a week ahead of time helps. It has to be sent and addressed to one Board member so that the one Board member takes responsibility.
- Another issue is the distance between us. We need someone to call others and put some pressure on them.
- Another possibility is the ISAC meeting, which has full agenda. You really have to pick your priorities, and hope that the other Supervisors are hitting the other priorities.
- You could set up a 30-minute meeting at ISAC because we're already there.

General Questions and Discussion

1. Do you have any additional concerns or questions you would like to bring to our attention that will be conveyed to the Task Force?

- Finance is the biggest thing that I can see. What is expected from us? That's what it really comes down to. We need to be able to make a decision and have the information necessary for making a good decision.
- It's the grayest area you have. If a Fire Chief or Sheriff calls someone in, they will come. If a bill comes afterwards, that can be a surprise. I would like to see a template developed that we can use at the local level regarding the activation of a team. It would need to include activation time, the process, and the incident command based on whom you call.
- If we have an emergency and there is a bill, we'll find funding.
- It is a gray area and we'd like to get rid of the gray areas.
- IMAC takes care of a lot of the gray areas. I'd like to be able to call the State and invoke that IMAC response.

EOD Policymaker Session
April 5, 2005 4:30-6:30 pm
Fire Hall, Mason City, IA

Attendees

Dale Feske, Howard County Supervisor
A Mick Gamez, Howard County Auditor
Darrell Knecht, Howard County EMA

State Public Policy Group

Jennifer Furler
Brooke Findley

1. Does your jurisdiction have a bomb squad, and has your jurisdiction signed the IMAC?
 - Yes, our jurisdiction has signed onto IMAC. The county is on board, but not all of the cities.

2. In your opinion, how likely is it that your jurisdiction might need to call-out a WMD-level EOD response team as we've described today? What is the most likely type of event to trigger such a call-out?
 - It's not very likely. We would rule out any hoaxes before we would call-out.
 - It is not as likely as other areas.
 - Screening processes will rule out needing to even call-out a bomb tech.

3. In the event of a WMD-level call-out, who do you think should be in charge of the incident?
 - At the local level. Chances are we would never need to call out a tech.

Adequate Coverage

The proposed plan would provide local WMD-level response capacity for EOD incidents statewide by leveraging Iowa's existing FBI-certified bomb techs. For the purposes of a WMD-level call-out, the team(s) would be considered a State resource, and the State would be responsible for the costs, liability, etc. of the event.

1. Based on the EOD resources you've heard described today, would there be an adequate capacity, from either local or State Fire Marshal's Office, of bomb techs to respond if you had a WMD-level EOD incident in your jurisdiction?
 - No. Bomb techs are busy doing other jobs.
 - The distance factor is an issue. You don't necessarily need the equipment there. It is important to have a tech there before the equipment arrives to make the assessment.

- The FBI limiting the number of bomb techs in the state was a mistake.
- Iowa needs more bomb techs in all of the areas. There are many people who would like to be a bomb tech. The State Fire Marshal's office needs to start training people now so that we will have more bomb techs at our disposal.
- Sure, equipment is important, but it is more important to find a funding stream for training.

2. This agreement necessitates that bomb squads travel outside of their home jurisdictions, if called to respond to an EOD incident. What concerns might you, as local policymakers, have as a hosting jurisdiction?

- Who is paying for it? The responders still have to go through a process prior to the WMD call-out, and that expense is concerning.
- The cost of maintaining the area. Local police helping out with clean-up and other hidden costs that are never addressed is also an issue.

28E Agreements

In a proposed 28E agreement currently under consideration by participating entities, the State of Iowa agrees indefinitely to pick up the costs of a WMD-level EOD response. Local jurisdictions remain, as they are now, responsible for the costs of routine, and non-WMD bomb squad response. Participating jurisdictions that have bomb squads will agree to maintain WMD-level response for a certain amount of time, even after state and federal funding for this initiative have run out.

1. Would you foresee a problem with local jurisdictions making unnecessary call-outs of the WMD-level EOD teams in attempts to shift costs of routine EOD events to the State?

- Yes. There definitely need to be guidelines.
- To stop that from happening, someone is needed that is ready and able to make a decision, and has the appropriate knowledge to do so. At least one or two people in each county, at the operations level, should be available and trained to assess the situation and contact the appropriate person.
- The counties could use the military for some of this.
- This system needs more support; otherwise, we will be putting too much pressure on the fire Marshals office.

2. Since it is a given that each jurisdiction will have WMD-level coverage for EOD incidents under this proposal, what, if any, degree of responsibility should your home jurisdiction have in continued funding of this effort? Is it fair to participating jurisdictions to have to bear the full costs of maintaining training as well as highly sensitive equipment?

- From the auditor's side, our budgets are already strained. Please don't put anything else on us.
 - Un-funded mandates need to stop.
 - However, in the world that we are living in- with school shootings and other terrorism- this is an important part of public safety.
3. Can you think of issues pertaining to response to your jurisdiction that the EOD Task Force may not have fully considered?
- No, the basic outline sounds good. At least we would we would have an idea of how to approach the situation, if we had to deal with a bomb.

General Questions and Discussion

1. Do you have any additional concerns or questions you would like to bring to our attention that will be conveyed to the Task Force?
- No additional questions or concerns.
 - I wish that more people had attended.

Law Enforcement and EMCs

EOD Stakeholder Session March 21, 2005 2:00-4:00 pm Marshalltown Hospital, Marshalltown, IA

Attendees

Jack McAllister, Marshalltown Police
Tom Heater, Greene County Sheriff
Dane Zuercher, Marshalltown Police

State Public Policy Group

Jennifer Furler
Arlinda McKeen
Rachel Scott

1. Does your jurisdiction have a bomb squad, and has your jurisdiction signed the IMAC?
 - No, Marshalltown has not signed.
 - No, Greene County has not signed. We just voted in our HLSEM region to fund the bomb squad robot for DMPD. That was \$50,000, under a mutual aid agreement for response.

2. In your opinion, how likely is it that your jurisdiction might need to call out a WMD-level EOD response team as we've described today? What is the most likely type of event to trigger such a callout?
 - In most cases, if it's a WMD- event, you'll know because it already went off. If you have an officer with some WMD expertise.... I think it's a mistake to concentrate these resources in specific locations. You need locals to have the resources. These bigger communities already have resources. A lot of these things are unknown. It will be a big chore just to get all of these people on board. It would be a better idea to spread the knowledge out across a region, so you can have an officer who stops a Ryder truck who knows what he's doing. If we need it, it will be a clean-up effort.
 - Des Moines is not that far away, unless there's a simultaneous event. We'd be second on their list, and that doesn't have to be a WMD event. Protecting their own city will always be the first priority. I'm concerned about small counties up north -- just to get a bomb tech on scene-- let alone a WMD event. With the FBI guidelines we're screwed, but we need lesser-trained bomb personnel. Someone who can review and report directly to the WMD, and not worry about the first bomb tech. Maybe send a picture of the incident for review by a WMD team. A bomb's a bomb to me, but someone with a little more training may be able to help.

We're worried about the response time when you have all of these steps. Since the burden of cost will be on cities if they're wrong, they will tend to delay responses. You almost want to do something yourself, because it will cost you a lot more to call out the team. You'd have to wait several hours for the team to assemble, also. You're going to have officers from every jurisdiction just to contain and evacuate. If they have a lower level person trained to check it out, you could save time and money.

- There is a Bombing Awareness class through the Homeland Security Training Center.
- We need someone else to call out the WMD team because no sheriff or chief would take the chance. You need the cooperation and funding without having to worry about the cost. Without intelligence, how do you know what it is? Any of these things could be very dangerous, whether it's called WMD or not.
- You've stuck a stake in the hearts of chiefs and sheriffs if you say, "You've got to pay for it if you're wrong."
- If an EOD is attached to a mass fatality substance or not, it's still a big deal. This is still out of the expertise of local departments, so why not make regional teams available?
- Normally we'd call the SFO, but it's like anything else, you might have to wait in line. It's free to call SFO, but not free to call DMPD.
- We have about a dozen EOD calls a year.
- We usually have none. The SFO guy in Denison just finished a tour in Iraq.
- That's the same problem with the methamphetamine labs. We've had to call clear to Dubuque because others were busy, etc. We just shut down the place for several hours. It's fine and dandy to call the SFO, but if they're busy or have worked too many hours per their guidelines, you're stuck.
- If some of this money could be provided for a lower level training- not be a tech, but do some counter-charging, some basic chemical interactions and awareness- that would be a better use of resources.
- What qualifies as a weapon of mass destruction?
- This should be handled like methamphetamine labs. We have two guys in our county who have been trained to look at meth. labs and call the state to say what they've got. On the state's advice, we respond or not.
- They're not going to buy bomb suits for all of these guys. If you can't view it safely, then there's nothing you can do.
- The bottom line is, somebody saw the thing. Even if the officer who initially responded just passes on what he saw.
- That training goes much farther than what we're talking about. It's not in anyone's head. You need a much wider knowledge base. When I was in Phoenix, we fought for all the gear for bomb squads, too. I'm not opposed to that.

3. In the event of a WMD-level callout, who do you think should be in charge of the incident?

- I think if you've got a true event, you have to give it to them.
- The people running those units are in charge. They know the capabilities, equipment, and training.
- It would be half and half. The perimeter is one thing. The incident is another.
- The unit coming in would run the command. You can't tell them what to do because you don't know.
- They need to be able to tell us what they need.
- They'll be political about it and ask us, even if they know better.
- You may have some areas where a sheriff or chief will react, and the EOD team would have to decide if they want to help or not.
- That puts you back to the response, but without being able to do anything. You can get input from the hosts, but the EOD people will know what needs to be done. The EOD experts need to be respected.
- The EOD units need to go out to the communities and tell them what they can do and what they can't do.

Adequate Coverage

The proposed plan would provide local WMD-level response capacity for EOD incidents statewide by leveraging Iowa's existing FBI-certified bomb techs. For the purposes of a WMD-level callout, the team(s) would be considered a State resource, and the State would be responsible for the costs, liability, etc. of the event.

1. Based on the EOD resources you've heard described today, would there be an adequate capacity, from either local or State Fire Marshals Office, of bomb techs to respond if you had a WMD-level EOD incident in your jurisdiction?

- We have a perfect response area with Des Moines, Waterloo, Cedar Rapids. Central Iowa has it made. For us, it's great. Other counties won't have the same luxury. If it's during the daylight hours, we'd have response in 1 or 2 hours.
- We're an hour from Des Moines and 45 minutes from Denison. We've always had a timely response. The Denison office is a one-person office. There are not that many SFO staff. We're better off than northwest Iowa.

2. What is an acceptable response time for an EOD squad, including an EOD robot and robot-trained technician, to be on the scene once they've been called for a WMD-level event? Why?

- Depends on what it is. The big thing is the panic of the citizens. If you have a dirty bomb ready to go off, one minute is too long. If it's already gone off, it's a clean-up.

- An hour. If it's much longer than that you'll be in trouble.
- An hour is perfect. It takes that long to assemble your own team. After that it's a waiting game.

3. This agreement necessitates that bomb squads would have to travel out of their home jurisdictions, if called to respond to an EOD incident. What problems might arise for the hosting jurisdiction during such a call-out?

- The one about the definition of WMD.
- You're going to have different communication frequencies. It would be better if you could work off of a state channel. It depends on what the EOD team would request and number of officers. We can only do so much. We have to worry about the rest of the town. Crime doesn't stop just because you have another emergency.
- The money would matter to the town halls.
- You never had that problem before because the money wasn't put there. Before, they would never charge because you would have done the same for them. Now money has been brought into it.
- Putting that funding stipulation into it kills the whole thing.
- So the feds are willing to buy a \$200,000 robot, but won't pay for basic EOD service for the rest of the state?
- Who declares it to be a WMD is our concern. What if it's a truck in the middle of nowhere?
- You're going to see us call in the SFO, and they'll make the determination.
- It may put a burden on the SFO.
- It would probably never happen, but with the kooks we have in this country, you never know.

4. With WMD-level callout expenses treated as State resources, would you foresee a problem with local jurisdictions making unnecessary callouts of the WMD-level EOD teams in attempts to shift costs of routine EOD events to the State?

- That's likely.
- You're back to recognition.
- Maybe if there were just one or two deputies in each area with a little more awareness level training who could let you know.

Callout Protocol

To prevent unnecessary callouts and ensure that EOD techs are available to serve their home jurisdictions as much as possible, local jurisdictions must agree to follow a somewhat strict protocol for the call out of WMD-level EOD response.

1. What, if any, are the limitations you foresee regarding your ability to comply with the callout protocol? In your jurisdiction, who would it make the most sense for to determine the need for a WMD-level EOD callout?

- It's going to have to be a SFM. You just about have to have a search underway. If it's a WMD, you won't have any advance.
 - My worry is the suspicious package, bomb threat—where they leave something there. We don't know if an object is a bomb or not. You're not going to search around a truck more than you have to. The problem is getting charged if you have a false alarm.
 - They may not be all that picky in charging you if you believed in good faith that you had a major incident.
 - You have two problems: getting charged for a false alarm, or not calling when you have an actual situation. We don't often have bombs, but we had a situation where they called out DM to x-ray a briefcase and it was nothing.
 - Des Moines basically told us they wouldn't charge us to come out.
2. What are the strengths of the proposed callout protocol?
- If you're talking about a smaller county, it's good to be aware of these units. Many might not know who to start calling.
 - Anytime you have shared services, you save money. Marshalltown would never be able to afford the training, personnel, equipment, etc. for this or Hazmat. Many of these are funded through the feds: the Superfund, etc. State teams save you money and manpower.
 - It's good to have resources available.
3. If your jurisdiction does not have an EOD team, who would you be more likely to call in case you needed help with a routine EOD incident? The local team nearest you, or the State Fire Marshals Office tech nearest you?
- We'd call the Fire Marshal.
4. During the start-up years of this statewide local response capacity effort the entire cost will be borne through federal funds. Since it is a given that each jurisdiction will have WMD-level coverage for EOD incidents under this proposal, what, if any, degree of responsibility do you think your home jurisdiction should have in the continuation of funding for this effort?
- I think it should go through our emergency management funding requests.
 - Replacing the suits? The way it sits now, if all resources are going to bigger departments, you won't have the smaller jurisdictions helping.
 - What you'll see is them helping units who are close, and keeping a contract with them like they do already. If we have a contract, it should be with the state—not Des Moines, Cedar Rapids, etc. If DMPD never responds here, why would we help them fund it? We call the state now, and it's free.
 - The State does charge—they tax us. These other cities don't. The state now wants to put a surcharge on some things—that would be a mistake.

- You're already paying for services with your tax money. If the state got out of the business of bomb removal, we'd contract with Des Moines.
- We're talking about who's going to pay the cost, and that's the last thing that would go through my head. We'd go if something happened in Des Moines and not give it a second thought.
 - Any time you talk money.... The county controls my budget so I find a place for it.
 - The burden will be shifted more and more to the state. If the Fire Dept charged every time they put out a fire, you'd have people trying to put it out themselves.
 - Isn't it ironic that this started with all this money, and now we're creating enemies by having people fight over the money? Here's the money for two years; good luck to you. If this is where the money that they're taking from regular police departments is going, this is a mistake. Some resources need to be spent getting the rural police professionalized and up to speed.
 - Service needs to be extended to wherever it's needed. It's a sour taste in our mouths knowing that our funds are now going to this, and we can't use it as freely as we need it.
5. How should this new capacity be rolled out and implemented so that all jurisdictions are up to speed?
- I don't know how you did this. I got my notice from the County Auditor.
 - Our association director sent the email to us.
 - If you present this in a group forum, it's going to be ugly. You would need to get someone from each of these regions to go out and sell it, but they would be in the same situation. Most administrators would say, "I probably wouldn't use it, and now I have to pay if I'm wrong!"
 - You have to get somebody who has an answer—period. Not someone who has a lot of "assumptions" and "thoughts."
 - This will be tough because you have a lot of agencies that will say, "What's in it for me?" or "It won't happen here." The money doesn't bother me—I'd rather have the state worry about it.
 - For this program to work, you'll have to get some people who have a chunk of this to talk to administrators. You have to offer some free training. Our meth. lab guys go out and do the Hazmat training. If people are trained to get a preliminary look, they'll be a lot happier. That'll help on WMDs, pipe bombs, etc. A lot of smaller departments would get into this if they could get some training.
 - It's not much different for Sheriffs. Everyone is seeing that there are plenty of changes. By all means keep up with the associations; some are better than others. Sometimes so much homeland security mail comes through that you don't read it.

6. Can you think of issues pertaining to your jurisdiction, regarding response, that the EOD Task Force may not have fully considered?
- A better level of training would help everybody. It would assist the EOD teams in being better prepared.

EOD Stakeholder Session
March 23, 2005 9:00-11:00 am
Cherokee Community Center, Cherokee, IA

Attendees

Gary Brown, Woodbury County Emergency Management
Todd Erskine, Storm Lake Police
Chuck Hirsch, Sioux City Fire Dept.
Mike Jones, Storm Lake Fire Dept.
Tim McKiernan, Pocahontas County Emergency Management
Mark Prosser, Storm Lake Public Safety
Brad Robinson, Sioux City Fire Dept.
David Schipper, Iowa State Fire Marshals Office
Ed Sohm, Ida County Emergency Management

State Public Policy Group

Ben Banowetz
Arlinda McKeen

1. In your opinion, how likely is it that your jurisdiction might need to call out a WMD-level EOD response team as we've described today? What is the most likely type of event to trigger such a call-out?
 - The Fire Marshal tends to be the first person contacted on threats.
 - Some felt the state could not declare a WMD event.
 - Members inquired about the definition of a "WMD event?"
 - It was noted that terrorism was also included in the category. Terrorism can be very broad and can encompass many events.
 - The regional bomb technician noted that he assesses the situation when he arrives at a scene, and noted the relationship to incident command; the bomb tech makes the call to bring in others.
 - Members want to label WMD because of the constriction it can place on responders, if it's not labeled.
 - Part of the reason for the robots is to ensure certified coverage statewide, even if the money folds up.

Adequate Coverage

1. Based on the EOD resources you've heard described today, would there be an adequate capacity, from either local or State Fire Marshals Office, of bomb techs to respond if you had a WMD-level EOD incident in your jurisdiction?
 - It was noted that if an incident occurs in a jurisdiction that currently has bomb squad coverage, the fire marshal could back them up.
 - Members noted that this plan allows statewide sharing of all teams, as soon as 28E's are signed.

2. What is an acceptable response time for an EOD squad, including an EOD robot and robot-trained technician, to be on the scene once they've been called for a WMD-level event? Why?

- It was stated that the expected response time for a technician is an hour to an hour and a half.

3. With WMD-level call-out expenses being treated as State resources, do you foresee a problem with local jurisdictions making unnecessary call-outs for the WMD-level EOD teams in attempts to shift costs of routine EOD events to the State?

- Members noted that the State would pay the bill if it were a state call-out, or certified from a Governor's proclamation.
- Technicians noted that local fire chiefs should not make the calls because they are not trained.
- Members would like this to be structured to allow for flexibility to handle pranks and real threats. Each jurisdiction has agreed to respond for a period after the grant funding ends.
- It was stated that there is a \$200,000 piece of equipment for everyone to use, all of that will need maintenance. Even if it is not for WMD/Terrorism there is a cost.
- It was asked if there would be two robots in Polk County? The city will maintain their robot. When the region bought their robot it was with the understanding that it would cover all of Iowa.
- Some members noted that they feel HLSEM does not want us to rely on IMAC; the state should cover this cost if there is a call-out under this agreement.
- Once it becomes a governor's proclamation, other resources will be used, and it will be covered by the state.
- Denison was the most desirable place to get to a location in any section of the state.
- For training purposes it can be shared with the understanding that "if you break it, you buy it," on a WMD call-out any robot can be used.

Call-out Protocol

1. What, if any, are the limitations you foresee regarding your ability to comply with the callout protocol? In your jurisdiction, who would it make the most sense for to determine the need for a WMD-level EOD callout?

- It was asked what would happen if a full call-out was not needed? Members noted that was a contingency in the 28E agreement. Once a bomb technician makes the call, the funds are available. There is a difference between a WMD incident and a need for more help.

2. What are the strengths of the proposed call-out protocol?

- Members expressed an interest in outreach, and the marketing of information in classes, seminars, county-by-county meetings, and regional meetings.
 - Interaction with Sioux Falls regarding the use of their robot was an option that was discussed
3. If your jurisdiction does not have an EOD team, who would you be more likely to call in case you needed help with a routine EOD incident? The local team nearest you, or the State Fire Marshals Office tech nearest you?
4. During the start-up years of this statewide local response capacity effort, the entire cost will be borne through federal funds. Since it is a given that each jurisdiction will have WMD-level coverage for EOD incidents under this proposal, what, if any, degree of responsibility do you think your home jurisdiction should have in continued funding of this effort?
- Members inquired about having basic, awareness training for to instruct all law enforcement on recognizing an event.
 - Technicians noted that not determination is made until they look at the device. Members would like to see the development of a course to increase awareness.
5. How should this new capacity be rolled out and implemented so that all jurisdictions are up to speed?
- Members recommended a two or three hour bomb awareness class to ODP.
 - Members would also like to see reimbursement to cities for this training.
 - There was some hesitation about having an exact list of items to look for- it can help the people who are making the bomb.
6. Can you think of issues pertaining to your jurisdiction regarding response that the EOD Task Force may not have fully considered?

EOD Stakeholder Session
March 29, 2005 7:30-9:00 am and 9:00-10:30 am
Dubuque Chamber of Commerce Board Room, Dubuque, IA

Attendees

7:30:

Craig Jackson, Maquoketa PD
Brad Koranda, Maquoketa PD
Ken Rundie, Dubuque County Sheriff

9:00:

Mike Bowers, Quad City Bomb Squad, Davenport
Gerry Bustos, Quad City Bomb Squad, Davenport
Greg Egen, Dubuque County SO
Don Huss, Quad City Bomb Squad, Davenport
Rick Lincoln, Clinton County Sheriff
Ken Rundie, Dubuque County Sheriff
Terry Tobin, Dubuque PD
Paul Van Steenhayse, Scott County Sheriff
Kim Wadding, Chief, Dubuque PD

State Public Policy Group

Londa Liddle
Arlinda McKeen

1. Does your jurisdiction have a bomb squad, and has your jurisdiction signed the IMAC?
 - No, neither Maquoketa nor Dubuque County have signed IMAC
 - Dubuque County has 28Es with all of the counties around Dubuque County and all of the cities in Dubuque County. They are currently working on getting 28Es with Wisconsin and Illinois.
 - Dubuque doesn't have the resources to put a bomb squad together. Dubuque County thinks it's good if they can have a bomb squad respond within an hour or two.

2. In your opinion, how likely is it that your jurisdiction might need to call-out a WMD-level EOD response team as we've described today? What is the most likely type of event to trigger such a call-out?
 - It is pretty slim that the Maquoketa area might need to call-out a WMD level response team. However, they have caught people making bombs in the area.
 - It is also pretty slim that Dubuque County would need to call-out a WMD level response team.

- There are several threats in Maquoketa and they hope that they will never have to use a WMD-level response team.
- Maquoketa uses the State Fire Marshal when they need to respond to calls about bombs.
- Is WMD a federal definition? Because there are several federal definitions and these definitions could be different than the state definition of a WMD?
- Dubuque county has had multiple mailbox bombs
- Law enforcement working together won't be a problem because they do that naturally. The problem will be with everyone else working together.
- If a threat is thought to have an economic impact it could be considered a WMD.
- Clinton County has an agreement with the Quad City Fire Department for Hazmat issues.
- We have to think more outside of the box as to what could be considered a WMD. What happened in the school in Russia, or suicide bombers could be considered a WMD.
- The Quad City bomb squad has an agreement to respond to anything in the eastern side of Iowa, and the western part of Illinois.
- A pipe bomb doesn't fall under WMD because it's not a mass casualty situation. Local enforcement need to call the State Fire Marshal or a bomb tech to make the WMD decision because the local police departments aren't trained to make the call.
- The 28E agreements will have the State's definition of a WMD
- If there are mass casualties or mailbox bombs like Luke Helder did, that is considered a WMD or a terrorist attack
- For a threat to be considered a WMD it has to fall under the National Terror Act.
- It is sensible for the State Fire Marshal's office to be called first, when the threat is in their jurisdiction.
- To call the State Fire Marshal's office is the protocol for most local police departments, etc. Everyone is under the assumption that if the State Fire Marshal calls for assistance, the state will pick up the tab and the requesting jurisdiction won't be required to.
- As far as repairing the robot is concerned, the jurisdiction in which the robot was broken should be responsible. The state should cover the expenses if the State Fire Marshal classified the call as a WMD.
- Repair of the robot would be covered by the requesting jurisdiction, if it were broken while it was responding to a call in that jurisdiction. The state would cover the robot repair if the threat were classified as a WMD by the State Fire Marshal's office.

3. In the event of a WMD-level call-out, who do you think should be in charge of the incident?

- The local enforcement officials will talk with the bomb technicians, explain the circumstances, and listen to all of the options that they see between the two command centers. The two groups will work together.
- It should be a unified command.
- The bomb technician knows what he is doing; he's going to give the local enforcement choices as to what needs to be done. The local enforcement is always going to tell the bomb technician to do what he/she has to do because they have the qualified training and he/she knows what they're doing when compared to the local law enforcement.

Adequate Coverage

The proposed plan would provide local WMD-level response capacity for EOD incidents statewide by leveraging Iowa's existing FBI-certified bomb techs. For the purposes of a WMD-level call-out, the team(s) would be considered a State resource, and the State would be responsible for the costs, liability, etc. of the event.

1. Based on the EOD resources you've heard described today, would there be an adequate capacity, from either local or State Fire Marshal's Office, of bomb techs to respond if you had a WMD-level EOD incident in your jurisdiction?
2. What is an acceptable response time for an EOD squad, including an EOD robot and robot-trained technician, to be on the scene once they've been called for a WMD-level event? Why?
 - 2-3 hours is realistic for a response time because there aren't enough resources for every place to have a bomb squad.
 - Local emergency people know what has to be done to keep everyone safe, such as establishing a hot zone and a perimeter.
 - Bomb squads don't know the level of people they have to send to a request because they aren't aware of the circumstances they are going to encounter. It's nice to have the ability that they do to send a few people and call up others if they are needed.
 - Local officials don't know how adequate their resources are because they don't know what kind of situations they are going to encounter, but it's nice to have the ability to call a bomb squad, if needed.
 - No one has any difficulty when dealing with the State Fire Marshal's office.
 - The response plan is good if there is only one threat in one area. It is not as good if there are multiple threats in multiple areas.
 - When ATF was called, they were present within a couple of hours. The response time was satisfactory to the requesting jurisdiction.
 - Dubuque County is one of the fortunate ones because they have lots of bomb squads in the area and can have someone present in a short amount of time.

- Why isn't the state broken into regions so that if there are multiple incidents at one time there will be statewide coverage, and one bomb squad won't be depleted? For example the Quad City Bomb Squad.

McKeen commented that the state wasn't broken into regions because they didn't want to get into the hassle of, "well I can't go over there to help that jurisdiction because they are out of my region." In addition, the way that the state is broken up now is the way it is broken up at the State Fire Marshal's Office.

- Could it be possible that someone waits 7 or 8 hours for a bomb tech, etc., to show up if there are multiple incidents?
- It could be possible that a jurisdiction would have to wait 7 or 8 hours for a bomb technician to show up if there are multiple incidents at one time. We don't want this to happen.
- There are no boundaries for bomb squads; they will go wherever they are needed.
- Bomb squads could give classes on how the first responders on the scene, and other emergency officials, should handle the situation when there is a threat present. Such as, how to establish a perimeter and locate the hot zone.

3. This agreement necessitates that bomb squads would have to travel out of their home jurisdictions, if called to respond to an EOD incident. What problems might arise for the hosting jurisdiction during such a call-out?

- If you call a bomb squad and they are en-route and have an accident before they get to the requesting jurisdiction, whose responsibility is it for those costs? 28E says that from the time the squad is called out until the time they return back to their headquarters the state will pick up all costs incurred for accidents and things like that.
- What if the operator (someone from the bomb squad) of the robot breaks the robot while in the requesting jurisdiction? The state will probably pick up that costs also since the bomb squad is acting under the 28E agreement

4. With WMD-level call-out expenses treated as State resources, would you foresee a problem with local jurisdictions making unnecessary call-outs of the WMD-level EOD teams in attempts to shift costs of routine EOD events to the State?

- I don't see unnecessary call-outs occurring since the State Fire Marshal's Office is making the call on whether or not it is a WMD from the start. It is protocol for most jurisdictions to call the State Fire Marshal first.
- If the bomb technician deems the incident a WMD, is there going to be a governing body somewhere that will double check his analysis?

McKeen noted that if the bomb technician says it's a WMD then the local Emergency Management Coordinator will take care of it from there. There will not be an opportunity to go back and change the decision of the bomb technician. This will be addressed in the call-out plan. The Department of Emergency Management won't go back and reverse the bomb technician's decision so the state would have to cover those expenses. The Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management is prepared to change the code for this.

- Bomb technicians will not be second-guessed. The State Fire Marshal's Office would be notified of the decision and would then contact the Governor's office after the decision.

Call-out Protocol

To prevent unnecessary call-outs, and ensure that EOD techs are available to serve their home jurisdictions as much as possible, local jurisdictions must agree to follow a somewhat strict protocol for the call-outs of WMD-level EOD response.

1. What, if any, are the limitations you foresee regarding your ability to comply with the call-out protocol? In your jurisdiction, who would it make the most sense for to determine the need for a WMD-level EOD call-out?
2. What are the strengths of the proposed call-out protocol?
3. If your jurisdiction does not have an EOD team, who would you be more likely to call in case you needed help with a routine EOD incident? The local team nearest you, or the State Fire Marshals Office tech nearest you?
4. During the start-up years of this statewide local response capacity effort the entire cost will be borne through federal funds. Since it is a given that each jurisdiction will have WMD-level coverage for EOD incidents under this proposal, what, if any, degree of responsibility do you think your home jurisdiction should have in the continuation of funding for this effort?
5. How should this new capacity be rolled out and implemented so that all of the jurisdictions are up to speed?
 - The protocol should be mailed out so that every dispatch center has one, and knows how to contact the appropriate people
 - Every association should also receive the information so that they can disseminate it to the members in their districts.

- A protocol list needs to be put together and a cheat sheet made for everyone. That way they have the appropriate numbers for the agencies talked about at these meetings & the State Fire Marshal's Office
- Use the ICN for the dispatch training at STARC, and make it a mandatory training so that the people who work dispatch are familiar with this information
- Each region should have the bomb squads take the equipment to the region to show those officials what is available, and what it can do. This would help to put this issue in the forefront of everyone's mind
- It may be helpful to get the associations involved as much as possible so that they don't try to lobby for changes as soon as everything is done and finalized.

6. Can you think of issues pertaining to your jurisdiction regarding response that the EOD Task Force may not have fully considered?

Additional Questions

Once it has all been completed are they going to send out phone numbers of who to contact in different areas?

EOD Stakeholder Session
April 5, 2005 2:00-4:00 pm
Fire Hall, Mason City, IA

Attendees

Dennis Borrill, Wright Co. EMA
Doug Book, Forrest City PD
Mike Keefe, State Fire Marshals Office
Jim Kenkel, State Fire Marshal
Kip Ladage, Bremer Co. EMA
Bob Platts, Mason City Fire Dept.
David Schipper, State Fire Marshals Office
Steve Urichs, Butler Co. EMA

State Public Policy Group

Brooke Findley
Jennifer Furler

1. Does your jurisdiction have a bomb squad, and has your jurisdiction signed the IMAC?
 - No- all of the jurisdiction has signed the IMAC.
 - IMAC- 75-80% of the towns signed on (3 responses).
 - Not signed onto IMAC, the mechanisms are not smooth, homeland security has not marketed it well. No one in Winnebago County has signed on.
 - This whole area- well represented by IMAC.

2. In your opinion, how likely is it that your jurisdiction might need to call-out a WMD-level EOD response team as we've described today? What is the most likely type of event to trigger such a call-out?
 - We're probably not going to need to a call-out, but we do need advice from the Fire Marshals office.
 - It's more likely to be terrorism than WMD.
 - Wherever you have a college, you're more likely to have a WMD threat.
 - Large industries like around here might trigger a call-out.
 - Animal Liberation groups- farming communities have been hit.
 - It's just as likely to happen here as it is in any part of the state.
 - Proximity to larger areas makes them more likely to be hit.

3. In the event of a WMD-level call-out, who do you think should be in charge of the incident?
 - The police chief or sheriff.
 - The mayor or local government.

- FBI if it is a higher-level incident- they will try/people will want them to take over.
- Areas need to maintain a unified front between Police and Fire Chiefs.

Adequate Coverage

The proposed plan would provide local WMD-level response capacity for EOD incidents statewide by leveraging Iowa's existing FBI-certified bomb techs. For the purposes of a WMD-level call-out, the team(s) would be considered a State resource, and the State would be responsible for the costs, liability, etc. of the event.

1. Based on the EOD resources you've heard described today, would there be an adequate capacity, from either local or State Fire Marshal's Office, of bomb techs to respond if you had a WMD-level EOD incident in your jurisdiction?
 - Yes, the plan set-up is ideal. If you have more than one incident- they will need to be coordinated. If that happens, this plan will be stretched thin, but it is the best option given the situation.
 - If we are cut short, hopefully they can render enough resources to keep it safe until we can deal with the problems at a higher level. The key is to try and evaluate the situation at the time- hopefully this will not happen.
 - We may have to call out another squad because of a lack of personnel at the main office location.
 - The regional team concept is not for the everyday situation, it should be reserved for more serious use.
2. What is an acceptable response time for an EOD squad, including an EOD robot and robot-trained technician, to be on the scene once they've been called for a WMD-level event? Why?
 - 3-4 hours, that's way that they are set up now. It is the same deal with the HazMat teams in Iowa.
 - There is nothing that they can do about the situation.
 - 2-3 hours for techs, 3 hours maximum for robots once they are all in place.
 - A lot of things could be improved by properly training local police and fire departments.
3. This agreement necessitates that bomb squads would have to travel out of their home jurisdictions, if called to respond to an EOD incident. What problems might arise for the hosting jurisdiction during such a call-out?
 - Where are you going to house them if it is a several day ordeal- no problems dealing with that, 28E would be paying for it.
 - No concerns with hosting the teams, we will make do with what we have, we're glad to have them available.

4. With WMD-level call-out expenses being treated as State resources, do you foresee a problem with local jurisdictions making unnecessary call-outs of the WMD-level EOD teams in attempts to shift costs of routine EOD events to the State?

- Education is part of that- training makes all of the difference. Knowing when to call for help is the most important part of the system.
- We want to shift any incidents to the fire Marshals office to be sure. This way, we could pass the expense onto them.
- EMC's would not be scared to call bomb techs since the techs will make the final call anyway. The state would not incur an expense until the bomb tech makes the decision.
- Don't think that the local people will call the state fire Marshals office as soon as they should, for fear of the incident being a false alarm.

Call-out Protocol

To prevent unnecessary call-outs and ensure that EOD techs are available to serve their home jurisdictions as much as possible, local jurisdictions must agree to follow a somewhat strict protocol for the call out of WMD-level EOD response.

1. What, if any, are the limitations you foresee regarding your ability to comply with the call-out protocol? In your jurisdiction, who would it make the most sense for to determine the need for a WMD-level EOD call-out?
 - Chiefs of Police and Fire should determine the need.
 - It is hard to get people trained. It has got to come from someone else to get them there.
 - Sometimes people won't come to anything unless they see a reason. White powder incidents in one county made a whole bunch of people go to a subsequent training session about chemical incidents.
 - Many counties and cities only have volunteers, so they don't have the time to go.
 - Some people might be "rusty," it has been a long time since it happened.
 - Concern about copycats after they do their exercise, however, they would still have to respond to any concerns.
 - A lot of incidents occur closely together. This can trigger bigger problems.
 - I think it is a good idea to operate in regions, however; they want to make sure that they don't lose their local contacts. This makes sense to have a system in place that is statewide.
2. What are the strengths of the proposed call-out protocol?
 - Training. It is possible to get the best-trained people on the scene.
 - The project is statewide. It increases bomb squad access to under-served areas.

3. If your jurisdiction does not have an EOD team, who would you be more likely to call in case you needed help with a routine EOD incident? The local team nearest you, or the State Fire Marshals Office tech nearest you?
- The State Fire Marshals office. They would be the easiest to coordinate with.
4. During the start-up years of this statewide local response capacity effort the entire cost will be borne through federal funds. Since it is a given that each jurisdiction will have WMD-level coverage for EOD incidents under this proposal, what, if any, degree of responsibility do you think your home jurisdiction should have in the continuation of funding for this effort?
- The problems with funding are the same at the local level. There is no money for it.
 - They don't even want to pay our wages, let alone bomb coverage.
 - These are the same issues as SWAT. If this is going to continue to be a statewide plan, everyone should pay for it.
 - If it is statewide, the state should pay for it.
 - Legislators should start stepping up on this issue.
 - A local team should not bear the brunt alone, of upkeep on robots, etc. everyone uses them.
 - Federal government should give more money.
 - The perception is that the target is not as hard in the heartland as in the Midwest. The rural areas are not any safer than anyone else. You are not going to hurt that many people, however; the sense of security is diminished for all.
 - My jurisdiction balks at HazMat funding, if push comes to shove, they would cut bomb funding before HazMat.
 - We will have to hope that people will understand that if they want to maintain this status of safety, people will have to sit up and listen.
 - It is important for the state and federal government to help support this.
 - Robots can be used for HazMat and SWAT.
 - The more technology that you have, the more reason there is to have the state pay for it.
5. How should this new capacity be rolled out and implemented so that all of the jurisdictions are up to speed?
- The Homeland Security Conference would be a great rollout opportunity.
 - IA Sheriffs Assoc., all associations for law enforcement in Iowa. The problem is, a lot of people don't show up at those meetings. Also, not everyone belongs to those associations.
 - There are very few full-time emergency management coordinators. If it were a full time position, they could do more. If the state would have full-time position in every county, they could be a lot more effective.

- We are just going to have to keep trying, every time there is a county meeting, try to educate more people.
 - They should have multiple county meetings. It takes time to set all of this up.
 - Education is the key. Just keep trying to reach new people.
 - There needs to be an overall plan, it needs to be sent to all chiefs of fire and police. This will make them aware that a resource exists, so when they are offered training, they are more likely to go, or send people.
6. Can you think of issues pertaining to your jurisdiction regarding response that the EOD Task Force may not have fully considered?
- Emergency Management Coordinators are 100% behind this.
 - People will not call. They are used to doing this the old way.

EOD Stakeholder Session
April 7, 2005 9:00-11:00 am
Atlantic Fire Department, Atlantic, IA

Attendees

Keith Brothers, Clarinda Police
Jeff Danker, Pottawattamie County Sheriff
Doug Glenn, Polk County Sheriff's Office
Terry Hummel, Pottawattamie County EMC
Jeff Hutcheson, State Fire Marshals Office
Rob Koppert, Cass County EMC
Keith Mehlin, Council Bluffs Police Department
Roger Muri, Atlantic Police Department
Joe Newton, Clarinda Police Chief
Dennis Rudolph, Region Four Fusion Center
Dave Schipper, State Fire Marshals Office
Bob Sievert, Shelby County EMC
Tony Updegrave, Montgomery County Sheriff's Office

State Public Policy Group

Sarah Dixon
Arlinda McKeen

1. Does your jurisdiction have a bomb squad, and has your jurisdiction signed the IMAC?
 - Montgomery – no, technician and we have not signed the IMAC.
 - Clarinda – no squad and we have not signed the IMAC.
 - Polk County – don't know if we've signed the IMAC, but we work with the Des Moines Police Department.
 - Pottawattamie Co.– we have a squad, and we're in the process of signing the IMAC.
 - State Fire Marshal's Office– I don't know if we've signed the IMAC.
 - Dave – we have a team, but we haven't signed the IMAC.
 - Council Bluffs– we have a squad, but we haven't signed the IMAC.
 - Pottawattamie County– we're in the process of signing the IMAC, and we have a squad.
 - I don't know if we have signed the IMAC.
 - Shelby County– we have signed the IMAC.
 - Cass County- we don't have a team, but we're discussing signing the IMAC.
 - Atlantic – we don't have a team, but we've signed the IMAC.

2. In your opinion, how likely is it that your jurisdiction might need to call-out a WMD-level EOD response team as we've described today? What is the most likely type of event to trigger such a call-out?
 - Pipe bombs that might be left in places all over the state. We are concerned about the impact at the local level. Yesterday is a suitable response time.
 - Pipe bomb incidents as well. The sheer numbers of them can be overwhelming.
 - My WMD nightmare is that a terrorist can do real damage up and down the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. There is a transportation issue, and I think the Omaha area is a target.
 - There are also risks along the rail lines, and I-80 and I-35.
 - We don't have expectations about a response time because we will need assistance. We are most concerned about the rail lines.

3. In the event of a WMD-level call-out, who do you think should be in charge of the incident?
 - The most qualified person in the area, given the situation. We need a unified command structure in place.
 - Law enforcement is in charge and that's how it reads.
 - We'll end up with a unified command. The bomb technician is the operations person, but the Sheriffs and Chiefs are in charge. It is a law enforcement issue.
 - The biggest risk is the railroads and interstate in terms of HAZMAT and WMD. I think we all know we'll get a response to that. We're worried about the pipe bombs that might be left at multiple sites. We just want to know where the response will come from, given several incidents.

Adequate Coverage

The proposed plan would provide local WMD-level response capacity for EOD incidents statewide by leveraging Iowa's existing FBI-certified bomb techs. For the purposes of a WMD-level call-out, the team(s) would be considered a State resource, and the State would be responsible for the costs, liability, etc. of the event.

1. Based on the EOD resources you've heard described today, would there be an adequate capacity, from either local or State Fire Marshal's Office, of bomb techs to respond if you had a WMD-level EOD incident in your jurisdiction?
 - I'd be concerned about the bottleneck with so few bomb technicians and State Fire Marshal's Office personnel. The public perception is of course different than mine.
 - I look up north and I feel concerned about that even though I live down here.

- It's not good up north because some days I'll be covering 33 counties. The bomb coverage is about 25-30% of the state.
- At a local level we see less dollars and I know this is also true at the state.
- The policy makers don't back up their convictions with money.
- The concern is also that we run our people too thin, and then they make a mistake.
- It is tough in law enforcement.
- This plan is specific to WMD, but it works a lot better than others I've seen.
- It's a starting point to grow from.
- We need to sit down with our legislators and show them this information. We need to keep the squads we do have.

2. What is an acceptable response time for an EOD squad, including an EOD robot and robot-trained technician, to be on the scene once they've been called for a WMD-level event? Why?

- We're just looking for a response of any kind.

3. This agreement necessitates that bomb squads would have to travel out of their home jurisdictions, if called to respond to an EOD incident. What problems might arise for the hosting jurisdiction during such a call-out?

- In the long run, we've ordered some new Level-A equipment. I'm concerned about the interoperability of equipment and training. Also, you're going to have to have a super call-down roster if you only have 34 technicians. The roster will have to be kept up to date and in a process for everyone to follow.
- If you have the squads respond, there are costs such as hotels, showers, and food.
- When the Fire Marshal gets to the scene and calls out one of these teams and then they find out it is not a WMD event, will the local community be billed?
- I don't see that as being a problem because that person is on the list to make that call.

4. With WMD-level call-out expenses being treated as State resources, do you foresee a problem with local jurisdictions making unnecessary call-outs of the WMD-level EOD teams in attempts to shift costs of routine EOD events to the State?

- I think it would be the opposite. People might not make a call because they're worried about costs.
- I'm allowed to go all over the state.

Call-out Protocol

To prevent unnecessary call-outs, and ensure that EOD techs are available to serve their home jurisdictions as much as possible, local jurisdictions must agree to follow a somewhat strict protocol for the call-out of WMD-level EOD response.

1. What, if any, are the limitations you foresee regarding your ability to comply with the call-out protocol? In your jurisdiction, who would it make the most sense for to determine the need for a WMD-level EOD call-out?
 - I think this whole infrastructure will take some maintenance and the call-down rosters will need to be kept up to date. There is an administrative framework. We must consider interoperability.
 - It was a surprise to hear that the State doesn't have a plan to have people on-call on the weekends.
 - We don't have a budget for overtime and there are union issues, but there is always someone available.
 - The bomb teams are like any other team, and they need to do some training together.
 - Each squad has a commander that comes together and makes the training and equipment decisions.
 - I'm satisfied with what is set up.
 - We are trying to get more people lined up as technicians, but it hasn't happened yet.
 - These teams are limited and if we get into a real incident, I'm wondering if the teams would be released to go anywhere to respond. I think there should be a set of standards to have some extra training to make the decision about a credible or non-credible event.
 - You can call bomb technicians right now and we have a checklist.
 - I'd be hesitant to send my team anywhere without the request of the Fire Marshal's Office or one of the other certified teams.
 - You are either aware or a technician. There is no in-between.
 - Is the State Fire Marshal's Office going to be the proponent of this in the future?
 - This is a starting point and hopefully it gets better as we go. We'll be looking for grants and other sources of funding so that we can build capacity. We have to support our current squads because we can't create new ones.

2. What are the strengths of the proposed call-out protocol?
 - There is more help.
 - It's something we don't have currently. There is a better chance of planning efforts.
 - I have more help with this, and that is a good thing. There is money to reimburse the local teams.
 - My Supervisors have the liability concern and I have no problem sending people to check out an incident.

- I think that IMAC will cover many of these issues.
- The lawyers will get to the table and this could become a nightmare.
- One improvement could be the coverage on the weekend. What if the only team available was the Cedar Rapids team?
- Can we get this covered given that it's a liability issue?
- It would essentially involve considering a local technician as a true state resource.
- This could be a mess, so we need to be careful.
- Could you add a clause, "if so asked by the state, you can become a state resource." This would have to be expanded beyond a WMD incident.
- The attorneys are the ones that would need to review this.
- If we get IMAC, and ask under IMAC, would you send your people to me? IMAC is anything.
- That might be the place it needs to go.
- IMAC does not take away worker's compensation issues for the sending jurisdiction. However, you don't have to send your people- even if you sign onto the IMAC.
- That's what any incident comes back to- who is responsible and liable. We all want to help each other, but the attorneys don't think like that.
- One of the strengths is that all of the technicians will have FBI certification; they will train together, and will be on the same page.

3. If your jurisdiction does not have an EOD team, who would you be more likely to call in case you needed help with a routine EOD incident? The local team nearest you, or the State Fire Marshals Office tech nearest you?

- It should be pay as you go. These teams need to be reimbursed, just like the meth. lab teams. I don't think other jurisdictions should be responsible for what happens in my jurisdiction. My supervisors would disagree with me.
- The state should be considering funding for these other teams because they will be tough to maintain.
- This is a statewide issue and should be funded statewide.
- If it isn't funded, we'll have people hurting themselves for no good reason.
- I'll be mad, as a taxpayer, if the Cedar Rapids robot is a state resource for two years and then gets stuck there because there's no funding.

4. During the start-up years of this statewide local response capacity effort the entire cost will be borne through federal funds. Since it is a given that each jurisdiction will have WMD-level coverage for EOD incidents under this proposal, what, if any, degree of responsibility do you think your home jurisdiction should have in the continuation of funding for this effort?

5. How should this new capacity be rolled out and implemented so that all of the jurisdictions are up to speed?

- I have a good relationship with the law enforcement in our county so I'll go back to some of those guys, but I was the only one that could come today.
- We need a dispatch template for everyone to use. You should give this to the emergency management coordinators.
- You can also use the associations and regional offices.
- It could be incorporated into the multi-hazard plan.

6. Can you think of issues pertaining to your jurisdiction regarding response that the EOD Task Force may not have fully considered?

- The Task Force did a nice job on this plan.
- I sit on the ISAC public safety committee and there was an effort to issue a policy statement to increase the number of agents. I think this is a possibility here, and would bring this to the attention of the legislators. The associations could use this to put a little pressure on the policy makers.

EOD Stakeholder Session
April 15, 2005 9:00-11:00 am
Jefferson County Hospital, Fairfield, IA

Participants

Randy Cooksey, Fairfield Police Dept., Chief
Tony Hammes, Fairfield PD
Daniel Hannes, Cedar County Sheriff
Gina Hardin, Des Moines County EMC
Ed Farley, Henry County EMC
Mike McDonough, Ottumwa PD
Steve O'Connor, Wapello County EMC
Rick SyWassink, University Hygienic Lab
Larry Smith, Keokuk County EMC

State Public Policy Group

Jennifer Furler
Arlinda McKeen

1. Does your jurisdiction have a bomb squad, and has your jurisdiction signed the IMAC?
 - None have bomb squads.
 - IMAC – county yes, cities no;
 - What is IMAC?
 - Yes, in Wapello County.
 - Perhaps the state law will change, having all jurisdictions included unless they opt out.

2. In your opinion, how likely is it that your jurisdiction might need to call out a WMD-level EOD response team as we've described today? What is the most likely type of event to trigger such a callout?
 - On a scale of 1 – 10, all responded either 0 or 1
 - For the school threats, about a 3.
 - If this country has an influx of suicide bombers, who's to say now? We will never know.

3. In the event of a WMD-level callout, who do you think should be in charge of the incident?
 - Local officials.
 - It's already predetermined.
 - A unified command.
 - They are just a resource that we are capitalizing on.
 - The local level; we are the ones that have to be held accountable.
 - When they go home, they will still come to us.

- We have a better understanding with the FBI than we do with the state.
- Local law enforcement has a challenge because you have local, multiple state, and federal departments. My perception is that you could end up with a literal fistfight with state and federal folks fighting for control. NIMS clearly states that the highest ranking local official is in charge with others as a resource.
- If you have a large-scale scene and a supervisor from the FBI shows up, what would happen? Can't answer unless it happens.
- It happens. The agent in charge showed up and there is a conflict. Normally things go pretty good. In bigger counties they do things differently.

Adequate Coverage

The proposed plan would provide local WMD-level response capacity for EOD incidents statewide by leveraging Iowa's existing FBI-certified bomb techs. For the purpose of a WMD-level callout, the team(s) would be considered a State resource, and the State would be responsible for the costs, liability, etc. of the event.

1. Based on the EOD resources you've heard described today, would there be an adequate capacity from either local or State Fire Marshals Office bomb techs that would respond if you had a WMD-level EOD incident in your jurisdiction?

- I really think they need to reconsider the areas of coverage. If there are six regions and six teams, they need to place them better across the state.
- Temporarily it will give us a warm, fuzzy feeling. After a few years, if these callouts are too often paid for by the state, then the costs will be placed back on the locals.
- If the bomb tech makes the call, that will help hold the costs down.
- Given the risk, I think this is more than adequate.
- How many techs are slated for retirement in the next 4 or 5 years?
- When I look at it from a local emergency management perspective this comes from 80% of resources. I think the teams and technicians should be used to do training for others at the local level.
- Who is going to teach my local officers about the basics and awareness?
- The state fire marshal could do some additional training in this specific area.
- I see where they have to get their ducks in a row to get this all in place, and the training will come next.
- When trying to train volunteer firefighters, we can't get our firefighters trained in awareness of any kind.
- Training should go into the firefighter school.
- If the state fire marshals office is going to do training, it should focus on local law enforcement and fire.

2. What is an acceptable response time for an EOD squad, including an EOD robot and robot-trained technician, to be on the scene once they've been called for a WMD-level event? Why?

- 10 minutes is adequate
- 2 ½ hours is adequate
- If we get response, it would be from Linn or Scott county. That would be at least 40 minutes.
- We're looking at a minimum of an hour to get response.
- It's going to take considerable time to get them organized and headed in our direction. If it hasn't blown up in that time, it will be Ok for the next few hours. It just puts pressure on the local jurisdiction.

3. This agreement necessitates that bomb squads would have to travel out of their home jurisdictions, if called to respond to an EOD incident. What problems might arise for the hosting jurisdiction during such a call-out?

- If we're going to have a long-term event, there are some resources we will have to include in our terrorism plan. I consider that a one-day. We will need the Red Cross for food, people to contain the site, etc.

4. With WMD-level callout expenses treated as State resources, would you foresee a problem with local jurisdictions making unnecessary callouts of the WMD-level EOD teams in attempts to shift costs of routine EOD events to the State?

- Even a grass fire intentionally set could be considered a terrorist act.
- No
- No
- No
- Unanimous no

Callout Protocol

To prevent unnecessary callouts and ensure that EOD techs are available to serve their home jurisdictions as much as possible, local jurisdictions must agree to follow a somewhat strict protocol for the call out of WMD-level EOD response.

1. What, if any, are the limitations you foresee regarding your ability to comply with the callout protocol? In your jurisdiction, who would be the most logical choice in determining the need for a WMD-level EOD callout?

- I don't see anyone in this part of the country jumping the gun to make the call. If the protocols are set down, we just follow the guidelines. Whatever is set; local agencies will follow. I've had a ton of faith in those folks over the last 30 years and I'm not going to worry about it.
- In the 28E agreement, it says they can cover their own jurisdiction. If they are getting this money, they should be required to go. (If the team is

responding in its own jurisdiction to a multi-county event, they could remain at home.)

2. What are the strengths of the proposed callout protocol?
 - That we have one now.
 - They have started the process and given us the resources to call upon.
 - I think that protocol is in place for years and it's not going to be that much different. I don't want to see the big boys take all the money and look out for themselves.
 - We have never had a problem with this getting abused.

3. If your jurisdiction does not have an EOD team, who would you be more likely to call in case you needed help with a routine EOD incident? The local team nearest you, or the State Fire Marshals Office tech nearest you?
 - I'd rather call the fire marshals office.

4. During the start-up years of this statewide local response capacity effort the entire cost will be borne through federal funds. Since it is a given that each jurisdiction will have WMD-level coverage for EOD incidents under this proposal, what, if any degree of responsibility do you think your home jurisdiction should have in continuing the funding of this effort?
 - Does anyone here realize what federal funds are? We are already paying for it.
 - The risk will go away when the dollars go away.
 - The risk is directly proportional to the dollars.
 - The state that is the most in a pickle, because they will keep doing this. Right now it doesn't cost the locals anything for it. If they decide they need to charge the locals, that is a big problem
 - After the performance period of the grant, the robots should go to the fire marshals offices rather than the cities.
 - I don't know if we would be able to contribute local funds to sustain this.
 - If there will be a user fee eventually, the government would be responsible for its own infrastructure. The private sector would need to pay for their own.
 - That would be up to the local policy makers.
 - I think the local teams want to recover some of their overhead.
 - Local governments are very, very in tune to the unfunded mandates. Local governments have had a belly full of unfunded mandates.
 - Local government would only take it over if they had a problem.
 - We're not stupid. We're getting started.

5. How should this new capacity be rolled out and implemented so all jurisdictions are up to speed on it?

- This approach through informational meetings. Once the program gets implemented, have the entities with the squads come down to talk about how to work with the local levels.
- They need to attend the law enforcement associations meetings. That must be one of the speakers.
- Governor's homeland security conference.
- Go to regions to facilitate unified command meetings.
- Get this integrated into local terrorism plans.
- Not only need to deal with government folks, also need to get it to the private sector. They need to know who to call.
- There needs to be information included for the dispatchers so that they know whom to call. Dispatcher training is very minimal – receive, record, relay.

6. Can you think of issues pertaining to your jurisdiction regarding response that the EOD Task Force may not have fully considered?

- What is the difference between this and any of our existing 28E agreements? This is between jurisdictions and the state.

Q. Where does the money go, to Des Moines?

A. It depends on the budget, and which teams will be receiving equipment and training- those jurisdictions will get the funds.

Q. Will the WMD teams make some reference to us so we can include this callout procedure in the terrorism annex?

A. Yes.

Q. Who is in control of the scene?

A. Control will be maintained by the local incident commander with a unified command.

Q. If this bomb tech determines it is a WMD incident, will this result in having the FBI involved?

A. Most likely

Bomb Squad/Explosives Teams

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Federal Emergency Management Agency

Resource: Bomb Squad/Explosives Teams						
Category: Law Enforcement/Security						
Kind: Team						
Minimum Capabilities (Component)	Minimum Capabilities (Metric)	Type I	Type II	Type III	Type IV	Other
Equipment	Blast Protective Clothing	(5) Bomb Suits; (5) Search Suits; (10) Cooling Vests; Tactical Body Armor (helmet with ballistic shield, fire resistant clothing, gloves & hood); Hydration System	(3) Bomb Suits; (3) Search Suits; (6) Cooling Vests; Tactical Body Armor (helmet with ballistic shield, fire resistant clothing, gloves & hood); Hydration System	(1) Bomb Suits; (1) Search Suits; (2) Cooling Vests (recommended); Tactical Body Armor (helmet with ballistic shield, fire resistant clothing, gloves & hood); Hydration System		
	X-Ray	(5) Portable X-Ray Devices	(3) Portable X-Ray Devices	(1) Portable X-Ray Device		
		(2) Real-Time X-Ray	(1) Real-Time X-Ray	(1) Real-Time X-Ray (recommended)		
	RSP	(5) Disrupters & Advanced Render Safety Capabilities; DEMO Kits	(3) Disrupters & Advanced Render Safety Capabilities; DEMO Kits	(1) Disrupter & Advanced Render Safety Capabilities; DEMO Kits		
	CBRN Protective Clothing	(5) Level A PPE (10) Level B PPE (10) Level C PPE APR	(6) Level B PPE (6) Level C PPE APR	(2) Level C PPE APR		
	Respiratory Protection	SCBA/APR necessary to sustain all team members	SCBA/APR necessary to sustain all team members	APR necessary to sustain all team members		
	Remote Stand-Off Capability	Complete Robot System	Robot System	Stand-Off Manipulation Equipment		
		Rigging Equipment	Rigging Equipment			
	Tools	Bomb Squad Hand Tools	Bomb Squad Hand Tools	Bomb Squad Hand Tools		
		Fiber Optics Camera	Fiber Optics Camera (recommended)			
		"COBRA" Computer	"COBRA" Computer			
	Monitoring/Detection	COBRA Monitors; personal dosimeters	CBRN Monitors; personal dosimeters			
	Explosive Transport	Total Containment Vessel (TCV)–Chemical/Biological	Containment Vessel	Explosive Containment Box		
	Communication	Intrinsically Safe In-Suit Communication Capability	Intrinsically Safe In-Suit Communication Capability			
Personnel		(2) Supervisors trained to bomb technician level (10) Bomb Technicians (2) Bomb Trained Medics (recommended) (2) Explosive K-9 Teams (recommended)	(2) Supervisors trained to bomb technician level (6) Bomb Technicians (1) Bomb Trained Medic (recommended) (2) Explosive K-9 Teams (recommended)	(2) Tech Bomb Technicians (1) Supervisor (recommended) (1) Explosive K-9 Team (recommended)		
Vehicles		(1) Primary Response Vehicle; (1) Back-Up Vehicle (1) Armored Vehicle	(1) Dedicated Equipment Vehicle	Equipment Vehicle		
Training		Post Blast Investigation Training–6 weeks; Basic Hazardous Devices school–6 weeks; Robot Operator's Course; Hazardous Materials Tech Training; Additional WMD Training; Advanced Access and Disablement; Explosive Breaching Training; 40 hours continuous training annually; 16 hours training monthly; Recertification every 3 years.	Post Blast Investigation Training–6 weeks; Basic Hazardous Devices school–6 weeks; Hazardous Materials Tech Training; WMD Training; Advanced Access and Disablement; Explosive Breaching Training (recommended); 40 hours continuous training annually; 16 hours training monthly; Recertification every 3 years.	Post Blast Investigation Training–6 weeks; Basic Hazardous Devices school–6 weeks; Hazardous Materials Tech Training; WMD Training; Advanced Access and Disablement; Explosive Breaching Training (recommended); 40 hours continuous training annually; 16 hours training monthly; Recertification every 3 years.		

Comments:

Type I– A dedicated full-time bomb squad, capable of handling a complex incident. A complex incident may include multiple or simultaneous life-threatening or time-sensitive IEDD incidents, involving sophisticated improvised energetic materials, electronic/remote firing systems, and tactical explosive breaching support. Teams shall consist of a minimum of 10 bomb technicians and 2 supervisors. Team must have render safe capabilities up to and including large vehicle borne IEDs (capable of containing up to 60,000 lbs. of explosive material) and CBRN dispersal devices. Team shall be capable of working in a CBRN environment and support tactical team operations.

Type II– A full-time or part-time bomb squad, capable of handling a moderate incident. A moderate incident may include a life-threatening or time-sensitive incident, involving sophisticated improvised energetic materials and electronic/remote firing systems. Teams shall consist of a minimum of 6 bomb

technicians and 2 supervisors. Team must have render safe capabilities up to and including a medium vehicle borne IEDs (capable of containing up to 4,000 lbs. of explosive material) and CBRN dispersal devices. Teams should be capable of working in a CBRN environment absent of vapors.

Type III– A full-time or part-time bomb squad, capable of handling a small incident. Teams shall consist of a minimum of 2 bomb technicians. Team must have basic IED render safe capabilities. Teams should be capable of working in a CBRN environment absent of vapors and liquids.

Definitions

RSP	Render-Safe Procedure
IEDD	Improvised Explosive Device Disposal
CBRN	Improvised Explosive Device Disposal
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
APR	Air Purifying Respirator
SCBA	Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
Level A PPE	Totally encapsulated chemical resistant vapor suit with SCBA
Level B PPE	Non-encapsulated or encapsulated chemical resistant suit with SCBA
Level C PPE	Non-encapsulated chemical resistant suit with APR
"COBRA" Computer	Chemical Biological Response Aide
TCV	Total Containment Vessel
WMD	Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction

Explosive Ordnance Disposal – EOD

The EOD survey was conducted to identify the capability and limitations of EOD operations within the law enforcement community. The survey has identified results, conclusions, and recommendations as stated in this report.

Nine law enforcement agencies responded to the questionnaire. There are 10 operational EOD teams in the State.

The agencies responding to the survey represented a cross-section of the State and will provide a reasonable data set on which to assess the ability to plan for, respond to, and recover from incidents involving WMD.

Overall, the State is in very good condition regarding EOD/WMD, as every team had personnel appropriately trained.

The assessment has identified the following results, conclusions, and recommendations:

1. Plans and Policies – The implementation of a statewide WMD response system will mandate the designation and inclusion of a regional WMD/EOD team. The primary responsibility of the regional EOD team would be to provide EOD assets and capability before, during, or after a WMD event. Examples of missions include some of the following (not all-inclusive): (a) neutralization of explosive devices, (b) detection and neutralization of “booby traps” in SWAT operations, evidence collection operations, and hazardous materials/WMD operations, and (c) execution of explosive entry techniques when deemed appropriate during a SWAT operation. All of this could potentially occur in a hazardous/WMD environment. *not recommend*

The regional response concept will require that the State include in its plan such issues as the composition of the team, the number of personnel on the team, the equipment for each team, and the interoperability of each team with fire, hazardous materials, EMS, SWAT, etc. The plan would address all other issues as needed, such as decontamination issues, in conjunction with the fire/hazardous materials assets. The plan would address decontamination of EOD personnel, weapons, weapons security, evidence, etc.

Each regional team, as part of the statewide WMD response system, will be required to develop and operate under a fully functional and integrated EOD/WMD plan in accordance with the State plan.

2. Human Resources – Each region, as designated by the State, would have an operational, regional EOD team made up of the appropriate number of personnel as deemed necessary. All survey respondents stated that two EOD technicians were standard for an EOD response, and this should continue with the regional teams. Consideration has to be given to the make-up of the team: for example, is the team going to be a single-agency team or a composite team made up of members of EOD teams from various departments? The advantages and disadvantages of each should be carefully

explored prior to a decision. There are a limited number of bomb technicians in the State; according to the survey, there are 40. This number should be assessed to determine whether it is adequate.

The following recommendations are made regarding personnel other than the EOD team members:

- A. EOD-trained medic – Each regional team should be accompanied by an “EOD Medic.” The person should be trained at the paramedic or higher level, be fully “nationally” registered with training in Advanced Cardiac Life Support, Trauma, etc. The paramedic should also be knowledgeable in EOD operations, have completed a specialized training program dealing with EOD emergencies, such as blasts, removal of bomb suits, etc., and have specialized training in handling WMD-related emergencies. This person would be a member of the regional team, and participate in all training, exercises, and missions. In addition, all necessary equipment would be provided to enable the medic to carry out his/her mission. Ideally, this person would come from the law enforcement community, but other arrangements could be made with agencies outside of law enforcement if necessary.
- B. Hazardous Materials Consultant – Each regional team should be accompanied by a fully trained and certified hazardous materials consultant functioning at least at the hazardous materials technician level. This person would provide expertise in hazardous materials to the EOD team, and provide liaison with the fire/hazardous materials teams providing decontamination and suppression support. This person should come from the law enforcement community, be trained to the hazardous materials technician level at a minimum, be familiar with EOD operations, and participate in all training, exercises, and missions.


Haz Mat teams

3. Training – All teams had basic EOD training. Most teams had personnel trained at the advanced EOD level and the WMD level, but not all members of all teams were trained.

The following recommendations are made for the regional EOD teams in the State:

- A. Hazardous Materials First Responder Awareness – All law enforcement officers are required by OSHA standards to have a basic awareness of hazardous materials. Most EOD personnel were trained at that level, but approximately 10% of EOD personnel did not have hazardous materials awareness training.
- B. WMD Awareness - All law enforcement officers should have basic WMD awareness training. 42% of EOD personnel have no basic WMD awareness training.
- C. Respirator Training – Most EOD teams reported having some sort of respiratory protection, ranging from APR to SCBA. All EOD teams should be brought up to a minimal level of respiratory protection, and provided training in the proper

Haz Mat Tech



selection, use, maintenance, and storage of the equipment. In addition, training should be provided in setting up and maintaining a respiratory program within each department.

- D. EOD/Hazwopper – The class would consist of training in the following areas:
1. Personal Protective Equipment – The proper selection, use, maintenance and storage of the selected PPE, along with a discussion of other types of PPE and the advantages and disadvantages of each.
 2. Respiratory Protection – The proper selection, use, maintenance, and storage of the selected respiratory protection equipment, along with a discussion of other types of respiratory equipment and the advantages and disadvantages of each.
 3. Detection and Monitoring – The proper selection, use, maintenance, and storage of the various pieces of detection and monitoring equipment selected for use in an EOD/WMD environment.
 4. Decontamination – To include self, weapons systems, equipment, and evidence.
 5. Scenario – Various scenarios would be executed, with each team using the training and equipment offered in the class.
- E. EOD Advanced – All personnel trained in advanced EOD operations as per State/local/national standards.
- F. EOD/WMD – All personnel trained in EOD/WMD operations as per State/local/national standards.
- G. Regular EOD/WMD training – Training to maintain proficiency in a WMD/EOD environment should be conducted on a regular, ongoing basis. Depending on the composition of the team, this could be done in conjunction with regular in-service training. The training should include maintaining proficiency in all areas of both regular EOD operations and WMD/EOD operations, including interagency training, such as decontamination training with the Fire/HazMat teams, etc.
- H. Exercises – Each regional team should participate in WMD exercises in conjunction with the regional WMD response system and with other agencies.
- I. Plans – Each regional WMD/EOD team should receive training in the State EOP, with special emphasis on the terrorism annex and the integration of the State plan with both local and Federal plans.
- J. Other – Any other training as deemed appropriate to accomplish the EOD/WMD mission, including attending national EOD/WMD conferences.
4. **Equipment** – Equipment received the most responses on the survey. It ranged from blast protection to robot systems. This report will also not recommend specific

manufacturer's products. It is up to the State and each agency to ensure that the equipment purchased meets all applicable standards, such as those of NIOSH, OSHA, NFPA, etc. It is also up to the State and each agency to ensure that the equipment is appropriate and adequate for the task, will provide the necessary chemical/biological protection, etc., and that all personnel are adequately trained in the use of and limitations of the equipment.

The following recommendations are made for the regional WMD/EOD teams:

- A. Respiratory Protection – Provide all regional EOD teams with powered air-purifying respirators (PAPR), equipped with chemical/biological cartridges. These respirators provide a protection factor of 1000 and positive pressure to the face piece. The face piece should be a full-face piece, rather than the hooded type. The PAPRs are lightweight, provide adequate protection in most WMD environments, provide respiratory protection in the case of the powered blower failure, provide air to the face piece under positive pressure, and are non-hazardous should they be hit with a round. SCBA could be considered for use, but should be carefully evaluated by the agencies before purchasing. SCBAs provide air under high pressure to the face piece, providing positive pressure to the mask, with a protection factor of 10,000. They provide better respiratory protection than a PAPR, but are bulkier and noisier, require more training and maintenance, cost more than the PAPR units, and have a higher fatigue factor. SCBA will be required if a specialized bomb suit, such as an SRS5, is adopted.
- B. Bomb Suit – Each regional team should be equipped with the appropriate number of advanced EOD bomb suits and helmet systems, providing the highest protection factor consistent with the EOD/WMD mission.
- C. Specialized Bomb Suit – Each regional team should be equipped with an appropriate number of specialized bomb suits, such as the SRS5. This suit is designed to provide protection in a chemical environment and uses SCBA, but does sacrifice some blast protection. It is not to be used as a bomb disposal suit and helmet system.
- D. Personal Protective Equipment – There is no single “suit” that will protect users from all hazards. The following recommendations are made with regard to PPE used by the regional EOD teams.
 1. Level A – Many departments indicated in the survey the need to have Level A suits for their EOD team. A Level A suit is a gas-tight, fully encapsulated suit, with SCBA worn under the suit. It has potential use in a WMD/EOD situation, and should be studied by the State and Regional EOD/WMD coordinators. The disadvantage of the suit is bulkiness, reduction in visibility, and reduced dexterity. If the suits are deemed appropriate for use by the EOD/WMD regional teams, disposable suits such as the Tychem 10000 are the preferred type. SCBAs will

all my
staff
have

- also have to be purchased and should be compatible with the SRS5 or other systems that are acquired.
2. Level B – At least two disposable Level B suits (Saranex) should be provided for each regional EOD/WMD team member.
 3. Gloves – Each team member should be equipped with an appropriate number of Nitrile undergloves and Butyl gloves in addition to normal work gloves.
 4. Helmet – Appropriate “hard hat.”
 5. Boots – Neoprene.
- E. Detection and monitoring equipment – The following recommendations are made with regard to detection and monitoring equipment for use by the regional EOD teams:
1. Monitoring equipment – 4-gas meter with built-in Photoionization detector (PID) with automatic data logging.
 2. M9 test paper – roll.
 3. M8 test paper – book.
 4. pH paper – roll.
 5. Radiation detector – pager type unit.
- F. Decontamination equipment – The following recommendations are made with regard to decontamination equipment for the regional EOD teams:
1. Small, portable decontamination units designed for gross, emergency self-decontamination. The units would be designed by the State in conjunction with the regional EOD teams.
- G. Communications Equipment – Each member should be equipped with an “in suit” specialized communications system capable of monitoring but not transmitting when near a suspected device.
- H. Specialized Equipment – The following are specialized equipment recommendations for each regional team:
1. Robot – According to the survey, there is very little robotics capability within the State. Each team should be equipped with a multi-use, integrated robot. This robot would be used for EOD situations, SWAT operations, and hazardous materials operations. The robot would be equipped to provide remote detection and telemetry in downrange operations in a WMD environment.
 2. X-Ray Inspection System with compatible X-ray generator – The system should be real-time viewing, lightweight, portable, have image zoom and enhancement capability, and fax/email capability.
 3. Electronic Stethoscope – Useful in the detection of mechanical run-back timers and electronic timing systems in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).
 4. Non-Linear Junction Detector – Useful in detection of electronic circuits in IEDs.

5. Disruptors – As deemed appropriate by the State and the regional EOD team coordinator. New technology exists in this area and should be evaluated—for example, the Sandia National Laboratories Percussion-Actuated, Non-Electric Disrupter.
- I. Other – The following recommendations are made with regard to other equipment for the regional EOD/WMD teams:
 1. Waterproof gear bag.
 2. Duct tape.
 3. Storage container for storing contaminated equipment.
- J. Other equipment as deemed appropriate by the State of Iowa in conjunction with the regional EOD/WMD teams.

The equipment package described above will provide the necessary protection to operate safely, efficiently, and effectively in a WMD tactical environment.

Evidence Response Teams – ERT

The ERT survey was conducted to identify the capability and limitations of evidence collection operations within the law enforcement community. No survey forms were returned, hence it not possible to assess the evidence recovery capability. For the purposes of this report, it will be assumed that no capability exists to collect evidence in a WMD environment.

This report will assess the following:

1. Plans and Policies – The implementation of a statewide WMD response system will mandate the designation and inclusion of a regional WMD/ERT team. The primary responsibility of the regional ERT team would be to provide evidence collection assets and capability before, during, or after a WMD event. Evidence collection could occur in a hazardous/WMD environment.

The regional response concept will require that the State include in its plan such issues as the composition of the team, number of personnel on the team, equipment for each team, and the interoperability of each team with fire, hazardous materials, EMS, SWAT, etc. The plan would address all other issues as needed, such as decontamination issues, in conjunction with the fire/hazardous materials assets. The plan would address decontamination of ERT personnel, weapons, weapons security, evidence, etc.

Each regional team, as part of the statewide WMD response system, will be required to develop and operate under a fully functional and integrated EOD/WMD plan in accordance with the State plan.

BOMB CASES FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2002

Co. #	County	# of cases	Disposal	Bomb Threat	Illegal Poss.	Suspected Device	Bombing
1	Adair	0					
2	Adams	0					
3	Allamakee	0					
4	Appanoose	0					
5	Audubon	1	1				
6	Benton	0					
7	Black Hawk	1	1				
8	Boone	2	1			1	
9	Bremer	0					
10	Buchanan	2	2				
11	Buena Vista	4	2			1	1
12	Butler	1				1	
13	Calhoun	1				1	
14	Carroll	4	3	1			
15	Cass	0					
16	Cedar	4	1		1	2	
17	Cerro Gordo	4	3			1	
18	Cherokee	1	1				
19	Chickasaw	0					
20	Clarke	3	1	1		1	
21	Clay	14	12			2	
22	Clayton	2	2				
23	Clinton	7	4			2	1
24	Crawford	2	2				
25	Dallas	2	1				1
26	Davis	0					
27	Decatur	0					
28	Delaware	2	1			1	
29	Des Moines	1				1	
30	Dickinson	2	2				
31	Dubuque	10	7			2	1
32	Emmet	0					
33	Fayette	4	3			1	
34	Floyd	4	3			1	
35	Franklin	2	2				
36	Fremont	0					
37	Greene	4	2			2	
38	Grundy	0					
39	Guthrie	0					
40	Hamilton	0					
41	Hancock	0					
42	Hardin	0					
43	Harrison	0					
44	Henry	1	1				
45	Howard	0					
46	Humboldt	0					
47	Ida	0					
48	Iowa	1				1	
49	Jackson	4	2	1		1	
50	Jasper	3	3				

BOMB CASES FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2002

Co. #	County	# of cases	Disposal	Bomb Threat	Illegal Poss.	Suspected Device	Bombing
51	Jefferson	0					
52	Johnson	1				1	
53	Jones	3	2				1
54	Keokuk	0					
55	Kossuth	1	1				
56	Lee	2	1			1	
57	Linn	3	2			1	
58	Louisa	0					
59	Lucas	0					
60	Lyon	0					
61	Madison	1	1				
62	Mahaska	0					
63	Marion	1					1
64	Marshall	2				1	1
65	Mills	3	1	2			
66	Mitchell	1	1				
67	Monona	0					
68	Monroe	0					
69	Montgomery	2	1			1	
70	Muscatine	6	5			1	
71	O'Brien	0					
72	Osceola	0					
73	Page	0					
74	Palo Alto	2	2				
75	Plymouth	1	1				
76	Pocahontas	0					
77	Polk	8	5		1	1	1
78	Pottawattamie	6	3			3	
79	Poweshiek	0					
80	Ringgold	0					
81	Sac	0					
82	Scott	2	1		1		
83	Shelby	0					
84	Sioux	1	1				
85	Story	2	1	1			
86	Tama	2	2				
87	Taylor	0					
88	Union	1					1
89	Van Buren	1				1	
90	Wapello	2				2	
91	Warren	2	1			1	
92	Washington	0					
93	Wayne	2	1	1			
94	Webster	0					
95	Winnebago	6				1	5
96	Winneshiek	4	4				
97	Woodbury	4	1			3	
98	Worth	1	1				
99	Wright	1	1				

Total: 167

BOMB CASES FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2003

Co. #	County	# of cases	Disposal	Bomb Threat	Illegal Poss.	Suspected Device	Bombing
1	Adair	1	1				
2	Adams	0					
3	Allamakee	1	1				
4	Appanoose	1			1		
5	Audubon	2	1			1	
6	Benton	1	1				
7	Black Hawk	1				1	
8	Boone	10	7	2		1	
9	Bremer	1	1				
10	Buchanan	2	2				
11	Buena Vista	0					
12	Butler	1	1				
13	Calhoun	1	1				
14	Carroll	1		1			
15	Cass	0					
16	Cedar	0					
17	Cerro Gordo	1					1
18	Cherokee	1	1				
19	Chickasaw	0					
20	Clarke	2	1				1
21	Clay	19	18			1	
22	Clayton	1				1	
23	Clinton	2	1			1	
24	Crawford	1	1				
25	Dallas	2	2				
26	Davis	0					
27	Decatur	2	1				1
28	Delaware	0					
29	Des Moines	1				1	
30	Dickinson	2	2				
31	Dubuque	6	4			2	
32	Emmet	0					
33	Fayette	0					
34	Floyd	3	1			1	1
35	Franklin	1				1	
36	Fremont	0					
37	Greene	1	1				
38	Grundy	1	1				
39	Guthrie	2	2				
40	Hamilton	0					
41	Hancock	1	1				
42	Hardin	0					
43	Harrison	2	2				
44	Henry	4	4				
45	Howard	0					
46	Humboldt	1	1				
47	Ida	2				2	
48	Iowa	0					
49	Jackson	1	1				
50	Jasper	3	3				

BOMB CASES FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2003

Co. #	County	# of cases	Disposal	Bomb Threat	Illegal Poss.	Suspected Device	Bombing
51	Jefferson	2	2				
52	Johnson	1	1				
53	Jones	2	2				
54	Keokuk	0					
55	Kossuth	1	1				
56	Lee	6	1		1	4	
57	Linn	2	1			1	
58	Louisa	0					
59	Lucas	0					
60	Lyon	2	2				
61	Madison	1				1	
62	Mahaska	0					
63	Marion	3	2			1	
64	Marshall	2	2				
65	Mills	0					
66	Mitchell	2	2				
67	Monona	0					
68	Monroe	0					
69	Montgomery	0					
70	Muscatine	5	3			2	
71	O'Brien	6	4	1		1	
72	Osceola	1		1			
73	Page	2	1			1	
74	Palo Alto	5	5				
75	Plymouth	1	1				
76	Pocahontas	0					
77	Polk	1				1	
78	Pottawattamie	5	2	1		2	
79	Poweshiek	0					
80	Ringgold	0					
81	Sac	6	5			1	
82	Scott	0					
83	Shelby	2				2	
84	Sioux	0					
85	Story	3	3				
86	Tama	1				1	
87	Taylor	0					
88	Union	0					
89	Van Buren	0					
90	Wapello	1				1	
91	Warren	1				1	
92	Washington	0					
93	Wayne	0					
94	Webster	1	1				
95	Winnebago	1	1				
96	Winneshiek	0					
97	Woodbury	4	1	1		2	
98	Worth	1				1	
99	Wright	0					

Total: 156